i
The TEHRAN YALTA & POTSDAM CONFERENCES
Documents
PROGRESS PUBLISHERS
moscow
TRANSLATED FROM THE RUSSIAN
TErEPAH — AJITA — HOTCOAM
CBOPHMK JOKYMEHTOB
Ha GQu2auucKom a3oixe
First printing 1969
Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
CONTENTS
Introduction
| The Tehran Conference (November 28 to December 1, 1943)
The First Sitting of the Conference of the Heads of Government
Conference of Military Representatives
The Second pisne of the Conference of the Hew of oa ernment ‘
The Third Sitting oe the Gonfevante: of the Heads a ‘Gov-
ernment
The Fourth Sitting of the Gontumnce af ‘he Heads oF Gov: ernment
Communiqué on the Copter af the Heads of Ghvernment
of the Allied Countries—the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain—Held in Tehran a eet Re co we os
The Crimea Conference (February 4-11, 1945)
1*
First Sitting Second Sitting Third Sitting Fourth Sitting Fifth Sitting Sixth Sitting Seventh Sitting Eighth Sitting
Communiqué on the Giimnes Ganferenee én the Huads St fence ernment of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain
Protocol of Proccedinies nf the Gres Conferente
25
38
40
51
54 65 80 97 104 114 125 129
133 140
The Potsdam Conference (July 17-August 2, 1945)
First Sitting
Second Sitting
Third Sitting
Fourth Sitting
Fifth Sitting
Sixth Sitting
Seventh Sitting
Eighth Sitting
Ninth Sitting
Tenth Sitting
Eleventh Sitting
Twelfth Sitting
Thirteenth (Final) Sitngy
Communiqué on the Tripartite Ganferenes a Bérlin Protocol of Proceedings of the Berlin Conference
147 158 168 184 198 214 229 240 254 259 271 293 307 317 334
INTRODUCTION
The Tehran (November 28th to December Ist 1943), Crimea (Yalta, February 4th to 11th 1945) and Potsdam Conferences of the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain occupy a special place in the history of the Second World War. At these Confer- ences the leaders of the three Great Powers debated and adopted concerted decisions on the basic military and polit- ical questions connected with waging war against Hitler’s Germany and post-war arrangements. These Conferences and their concrete decisions were vital to the formation of an anti-nazi coalition, the co-ordination of military efforts and the mobilisation of all peoples, for the defeat of nazi Germany.
The Second World War and the Tehran, Yalta and Pots- dam Conferences vividly proved the possibility of co-opera- tion between countries with different socio-economic systems in the struggle against a common aggressor and the possi- bility of a mutually acceptable decision on topical ques- tions. Here we do justice to the leaders of the Western coun- tries which during the war entered into military and politi- cal co-operation with the Soviet Union against the common enemy, nazi Germany.
The decisions of the “big three” at these Conferences have topical significance today and are closely related to the prob- lems being wrestled with in modern Europe. Among these decisions particularly important are the Potsdam Agreements aimed at smashing militarism and revanchism in Germany and obviating the threat of a new war for the peoples of Europe and the whole world. The socialist countries and all the peace-loving forces of Europe are pressing for the imple- mentation of the Potsdam decisions, for only scrupulous
5
observance of them can obviate the danger hanging over Europe and the whole world as a result of the rebirth in West Germany, with the support and connivance of the United States of America and other Western powers, of the forces which had already plunged the world into the abyss of the most devastating war in the history of mankind.
We present here the text of Soviet records made during the sittings of the three Conferences (no agreed records were made at the Conferences; each delegation made its own records independently). They bear out the Soviet Union’s loyalty to the ideas of peace, democracy and progress and its tireless campaign for a just settlement of post-war prob- lems in the interests of peoples, for achieving European se- curity, creating the conditions rendering impossible the rebirth of militarist forces in Germany and a repetition of aggression and for the development of international co- operation and securing the right of every people to deter- mine its destiny independently.
The documents in the book were published in the journal International Affairs over the period 1961-1966.
THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE (November 28 to December 1, 1943)
The First Sitting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain
Tehran, November 28, 1943 Opened: 16.00; Closed: 19.30
Roosevelt: As the youngest head of Government present here I should like to take the liberty of speaking first. I should like to assure the members of the new family—the members of the present conference gathered around this table—that we are gathered here for one purpose, for the purpose of winning the war as soon as possible.
I should also like to say a few words about the conduct of the conference. We do not intend to make public any- thing that will be said here, but we shall address each other as friends, openly and candidly. I think that this conference will be a success, and that our three nations, which united in the course of the present war, will strengthen their ties and will create the prerequisites for the close co-operation of future generations. Our staffs can discuss military matters, and our delegations, although we do not have any fixed agenda, can discuss other problems as well, such, for exam- ple, as problems of the post-war settlement. If, however, you do not wish to discuss such problems, they can be left aside.
Before beginning our work I should like to know if Mr. Churchill wishes to say a few general words on the impor- tance of this meeting, and what this meeting means to humanity.
Churchill: This is the greatest concentration of world forces that ever existed in the history of mankind. We hold
7
the solution of the problem of reducing the length of the war, the winning of victory, the future of mankind. I pray that we may be worthy of this remarkable opportunity grant- ed to us by God, the opportunity of serving mankind.
Roosevelt: Would Marshal Stalin like to say anything?
Stalin: In greeting this conference of the representatives of the three Governments I should like to make a few re- marks. I think we are being pampered by history. She has given us possession of very big forces and very great opportunities. I hope that we shall do everything at this conference to make due use, within the framework of our co-operation, of the power and authority that our peoples have vested in us. Let us now begin our work.
Roosevelt: May J start with a general review of the war and the requirements of the war at the present time. Of course, I shall speak of this from the standpoint of the U.S.A. We, like the British Empire and the Soviet Union, hope for an early victory. I should like to start with a re- view of that part of the war which concerns the United States rather than the Soviet Union and Great Britain. I mean the war in the Pacific Ocean, where the United States bears the brunt of the war, receiving help from the Austra- lian and New Zealand forces. ...
Taking up the more important question, which is of great- er interest to the Soviet Union—the operation across the Channel—I should like to say that we have been drawing up our plans for the last year and a half, but because of the shortage of tonnage we were unable to decide on a date for this operation. We want not only to cross the Channel, but to pursue the enemy into the heart of the territory. The English Channel is that unpleasant strip of water that ex- cludes the possibility of starting the expedition across the Channel before May 1, that is why the plan drawn up at Quebec was based on the premise that the expedition across the Channel would be made on approximately May 1, 1944. All landing operations involve special craft. If we under- take large-scale landing operations in the Mediterranean, the expedition across the Channel will have to be postponed for two or three months. That is why we should like to have the advice of our Soviet colleagues on the matter, and also advice on how best to use the forces now in the Mediterra- nean area, considering that there are few ships there too. But we do not want to defer the date of the invasion across
8
| |
the Channel beyond May or June. At the same time there are many places where Anglo-American forces could be used. They could be used in Italy, in the Adriatic area, in the Aegean area, and finally, to help Turkey if she enters the war. All this we must decide here. We should very much like to help the Soviet Union and to draw off a part of the German forces from the Soviet front. We should like to have the advice of our Soviet friends on how we could best ease their position.
Would Mr. Churchill like to add anything?
Churchill: May 1 speak and express my opinion after Marshal Stalin has expressed his. At the same time I should like to say that I agree in principle with what has been said by President Roosevelt.
Stalin: As for the first part of Mr. President’s speech con- cerning the war in the Pacific Area, we can say the follow- ing: We Russians welcome the successes that have been and are being scored by the Anglo-American forces in the Pacific.
As for the second part of Mr. President’s speech about the war in Europe, I also have several remarks to make.
First of all, a few words in the form of a report about the way we have been and are conducting operations since the July offensive of the Germans. If I am going into too great detail I could shorten my statement.
Churchill: We are prepared to hear everything you wish to say.
Stalin: 1 must say, in passing, that we ourselves have been lately preparing for an offensive. The Germans were ahead of us, but since we had been preparing for an offensive and had massed a great force, after we beat back the German offensive, it was relatively easy for us to go over to the offensive. I must say that although the opinion about us is that we plan everything beforehand, we did not expect the successes we scored in August and September. Contrary to our expectations the Germans proved to be weaker than we expected. At present, according to our intelligence, the Germans have 210 divisions on our front, and another six divisions on the way there. In addition, there are 50 non- German divisions, including the Finns. Thus, altogether the Germans have 260 divisions on our front, including up to 10 Hungarian, up to 20 Finnish, and up to 16 or 18 Ruma- nian.
Roosevelt: What is the numerical strength of a German division?
Stalin: The German division consists roughly of from 8,000 to 9,000 men, excluding auxiliary forces. With the auxiliary forces the division numbers from 12,000 to 13,000 men. Last year, there were 240 divisions on our front, 179 of them German. This year, there are 260 divisions on our front, 210 of them German, with six German divisions on their way to the front. From 300 to 330 divisions are operat- ing on the Russian side. Thus, we have more divisions than the Germans together with their satellites. This surplus of forces is being used for offensive operations. Otherwise there would have been no offensive. But as time goes on the differ- ence between the number of Russian and German divi- sions becomes smaller. Another great difficulty is that the Germans are barbarously destroying everything as they retreat. This makes ammunition supply more difficult. That is the reason why our offensive has slowed down. In the last three weeks the Germans launched offensive operations in the Ukraine, south and west of Kiev. They have recap- tured Zhitomir, an important railway junction. This has been announced. It looks as if one of these days they will take Korosten, also an important railway junction. In that area the Germans have five new tank divisions and three old tank divisions, altogether 8 tank divisions, and also 22 or 23 infantry and motorised divisions. Their goal is to recapture Kiev. Thus, we are faced with some difficulties in the future.
That isthe report part about our operations in the summer.
Now a few words about the place where operations of the Anglo-American forces in Europe would be desirable in order to ease the situation on our front. I may be mistaken, but we Russians thought that the Italian theatre was impor- tant only to the extent of ensuring free navigation of Allied shipping in the Mediterranean Sea. Only in that sense is the Italian theatre of operations important. That is what we thought, and that is what we continue to think. As for the idea of launching an offensive from Italy directly against Germany, we Russians think that the Italian theatre is not suitable for such purposes. Consequently, the fact is that the Italian theatre is important for free navigation in the Mediterranean, but it is of no significance in the sense of further operations against Germany, because the Alps block
10
the way and hinder any advance towards Germany. We Rus- sians believe that the best result would be yielded by a blow at the enemy in Northern or North-Western France. Even operations in Southern France would be better than opera- tions in Italy. It would be a good thing if Turkey were prepared to open the way for the Allies. After all, it would be nearer from the Balkans to the heart of Germany. There, the way is not blocked either by the Alps or the Channel. But Germany’s weakest spot is France. Of course, this is a difficult operation, and the Germans in France will defend themselves desperately; nevertheless that is the best solu- tion. Those are all the remarks I have.
Churchill: We have long since agreed with the United States to attack Germany via Northern or North-Western France, and extensive preparations for this are under way. It would be necessary to give many facts and figures to show why we were unable to carry out these operations in 1943. But we have decided to attack Germany in 1944. The place for the attack against Germany was selected in 1943. We are now faced with the task of creating the conditions for the possibility of transferring an army into France across the Channel in the late spring of 1944. The forces that we shall be able to accumulate for that purpose in May or June will consist of 16 British and 19 American divisions. But these divisions are stronger numerically than the German divisions of which Marshal Stalin spoke. These forces would be followed by the main force, and it is planned that the whole of Operation Overlord! will involve the transfer of about a million men across the Channel in May, June and July. Together with the armies in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean it is all we Britons can give, considering our 46-million population and the numerical strength of our air force. Remanning of the above-mentioned divisions depends on the United States. But the date I mentioned is still far off. It will arrive in six months’ time. In the talks between the President and myself we asked each other how best to use our forces in the Mediterranean in order to help the Russians, without any detriment to Overlord, so that this operation could be carried out in time or, possibly, with some delay. We have already sent seven battle-wise divisions from the Mediterranean area, and also a part of the landing
1 Overlord—the code name for the forced crossing of the Channel.
1
craft for Overlord. Taking this into account, and the bad weather in Italy besides, | must say that we are somewhat disappointed at not yet having taken Rome. Our first task is to take Rome, and we expect to wage the decisive battle in January and to win it. General Alexander, the Command- er of the 15th Army Group who is under the orders of General Eisenhower, believes that it is quite possible to win the battle for Rome. In addition, it may be possible to cap- ture and destroy more than 11 or 12 enemy divisions. We are not planning to move on into Lombardy or to cross the Alps into Germany. We merely plan to move on somewhat north of Rome up to the Pisa-Rimini line, after which we could make the landing in Southern France and across the Channel.
The next important question is to convince Turkey to enter the war. This would make possible the opening of commu- nications through the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, and we could send supplies to Russia across the Black Sea. Besides, we could use the Turkish airfields to fight the enemy. It would take only a small force to occupy Rhodes and other islands. We could then establish direct contact with the Rus- sians and send them supplies continuously. We have been able up to now to send only four convoys to Russia’s north- ern ports, because of a shortage of escorts but if a way is opened across the Black Sea we could regularly send sup- plies to southern Russian ports.
Stalin: It should be said that these convoys arrived with- out losses, without having met the enemy on the way.
Churchill: How can we make Turkey enter the war? What will she have to do? Will she have to attack Bulgaria and declare war on Germany? Will she have to start offensive operations or should she refrain from advancing into Thrace? What would be the Russian attitude to the Bulgarians who still remember that Russia liberated them from the Turks? What effect would that have on the Rumanians, who are already looking for ways out of the war? How would that affect Hungary? Would not the result of this be great polit- ical changes among many countries? All these are questions on which our Russian friends, naturally, have their own views.
Are our operations in the eastern part of the Mediter- ranean, which could cause some delay in the operation across the Channel, of any interest to the Soviet Government?
12
We do not as yet have any definite decision on this question, and we have come here to settle it.
Roosevelt: There is another possibility. It might be expe- dient to make a landing in the northern part of the Adriatic when the Soviet armies approach Odessa.
Churchill: 1f we take Rome and block Germany from the south, we would then commence operations in Western or Southern France, and also extend assistance to the guer- rilla armies. These operations are not yet worked out in detail. A commission could be set up to study the question and draw up a document in full detail.
Stalin: I have a few questions: I understand that there are 35 divisions for invasion operations in the north of France.
Churchill: Yes, that is correct.
Stalin: Before the operations to invade the north of France it is planned to carry out the operation in the Italian theatre to take Rome, after which it is planned to go on the defen- sive in Italy.
Churchill: Yes. We are already withdrawing seven divi- sions from Italy.
Stalin: I also understand that three other operations are planned, one of which will consist of a landing in the Adriatic area.
Churchill: The carrying out of these operations may be useful to the Russians. After the seven divisions are dis- patched from the Mediterranean area, we shall have up to 35 divisions for the invasion of Northern France. In addi- tion, we shall have 20 or 23 divisions in Northern Italy.
I should like to add that the greatest problem is the trans- fer of the necessary forces. As I have already pointed out, Operation Overlord will be started by 35 divisions. From then on the number of troops will be increased by divisions transferred from the U.S.A.; their number will go up to 50 or 60. J want to add that in the next six months the Brit- ish and American air force now in Britain will be doubled and trebled. In addition, work is being continuously carried on to accumulate forces in Britain.
Stalin: Another question. Did I understand correctly that apart from the operations to take Rome it is planned to car- ry out another operation in the Adriatic, and also an oper- ation in Southern France?
Churchill: The plan is to carry out an attack in Southern France at the moment Operation Overlord is launched.
13
Troops that can be released from Italy will be used for this. But this operation has not yet been worked out in detail.
Stalin: Another question: if Turkey enters the war, what is to be done in that case?
Churchill: 1 can say that it would take no more than two or three divisions to take the islands along the west coast of Turkey so as to allow the supply ships to go to Turkey, and also to open the route to the Black Sea. But the first thing we shall do is send the Turks 20 air squadrons and several air defence regiments, which can be done without detriment to other operations.
Stalin: In my opinion, it would be better to make Opera- tion Overlord the basis of all operations in 1944. If a land- ing were made in Southern France at the same time as that operation, both groups of forces could join in France. That is why it would be well to have two operations: Operation Overlord and the landing in Southern France as a support- ing operation. At the same time the operation in the Rome area would be a diversionary operation. In carrying out the landing in France from the North and the South, there could be a build up of forces when these forces are joined. France is Germany’s weak spot. As for Turkey, I doubt that Turkey will enter the war. She will not join the war no mat- ter what pressure we exert. That is my opinion.
Churchill: We understood that the Soviet Government is highly interested in making Turkey enter the war. Of course, we may fail to make Turkey enter the war, but we must try to do everything in this respect.
Stalin: Yes, we must try to get Turkey to enter the war.
Churchill: I agree with Marshal Stalin’s considerations concerning the undesirability of dispersing the forces, but if we have 25 divisions in the Mediterranean area, three or four divisions and 20 air squadrons may well be set aside for Turkey, particularly since they are at present being used to Ero Egypt, and they could be moved from there to the nortn.
Stalin: That is a big force, these 20 air squadrons. Of course, it would be a good thing if Turkey entered the war.
Churchill: Vm afraid that in this six-month period, during which we could take Rome and prepare for big operations in Europe, our army will remain inactive and will not exert pressure on the enemy. I fear that in that case Parliament
14
would reproach me for not giving any assistance to the Rus- sians.
Stalin: | think that Overlord is a big operation. It would be considerably facilitated and would be sure to have an effect if it were supported from the south of France. I per- sonally would go to this extreme. I would go on the defen- sive in Italy, abandoning the capture of Rome, and would start an operation in Southern France, drawing off German forces from Northern France. In about two or three months I would start the operation in the north of France. This plan would ensure the success of Operation Overlord; the two armies could meet, and that would result in a build up of forces.
Churchill: 1 could adduce even more arguments but I wish to say only that we would be weaker if we did not take Rome. Besides, in order to carry out an air offensive against Germany it is necessary to reach the Pisa-Rimini line. I should like the military specialists to discuss this question. The struggle for Rome is already on, and we expect to take Rome in January. Refusal to take Rome would mean our defeat, and I could not explain this to the House.
Roosevelt: We could carry out Overlord on time if there were no operations in the Mediterranean. If there are operations in the Mediterranean this will defer the date of Operation Overlord. I should not like to delay Overlord.
Stalin: From the experience of our operations we know that success is gained where the blow is dealt from two sides, and that operations undertaken from one side do not yield enough effect. That is why we try to strike at the enemy from two sides to make him shuttle his forces from one side to another. I think that in this case too it would be well to carry out the operation from the south and the north of France.
Churchill: 1 personally quite agree with this, but I think that we might undertake diversionary acts in Yugoslavia, and also make Turkey join the war, regardless of the inva- sion of Southern or Northern France. I personally regard the idleness of our army in the Mediterranean as a highly negative fact. That is why we cannot guarantee that the date of May 1 will be met precisely. It would be a big mis- take to fix that date. I cannot sacrifice the operations in the Mediterranean just to keep the date of May 1. Of course
15
we must come to a definite agreement on the matter. This question could be discussed by our military specialists.
Stalin: All right. We did not expect a discussion of purely military matters, that is why we did not invite representa- tives of the General Staff to come along, but I think that Marshal Voroshilov and I can arrange something.
Churchill: What are we to do with the question of Tur- key? Should we also refer it to the military specialists?
Stalin: It is both a political and a military question. Turkey is an ally of Great Britain and has friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Turkey should no longer play between us and Germany.
Churchill: I may possibly have six or seven questions concerning Turkey. But I should first like to consider them.
Stalin: Very well.
Roosevelt: Of course, | favour making Turkey enter the war, but if I were in the place of the Turkish President, | would ask a price that could be paid only by inflicting damage on Operation Overlord.
Stalin: There should be an effort to make Turkey fight. She has many idle divisions.
Churchill: We all have feelings of friendship for each other, but we naturally have differences. We need time and patience.
Stalin: That’s right.
Roosevelt: And so, the military experts are meeting to- morrow morning, and at four o'clock there is a session of the conference.
Conference of Military Representatives November 29, 1948, at 10.30
Admiral Leahy suggests that General Brooke should re- port on the Mediterranean theatre of military operations.
Gen. Brooke says that the cardinal task facing the Anglo- Americans is to exert pressure on the enemy wherever pos- sible. At the same time it is desirable to stem the tide of German divisions that could be directed by the Germans to Northern France where their increase would be undesir- able. Operation Overlord will divert a great number of Ger- man divisions. But this operation cannot take place before
16
May 1, as the most suitable date for the landing. That is why there will be a break of five or six months before the start of this operation, during which something must be done to draw off the German divisions. Brooke says that the British have big forces in the Mediterranean, which they wish to use in the best possible way.
Addressing General Marshall, Brooke says that if he says anything that does not accord with the opinion of the Amer- icans, he, Brooke, asks that he be interrupted.
Gen. Marshall asks Brooke to continue his review.
Brooke says that the Anglo-American plans provide for active operations on all fronts, including those in the Medi- terranean. At present there are 23 German divisions in Cen- tral and Northern Italy. The Anglo-Americans have enough forces to move the front up into Northern Italy. But in view of the terrain, the Anglo-American forces are unable to exert enough direct pressure on the German troops, and that is why it will be necessary to carry out a flanking operation from the sea. It is expected that this operation will involve 11 or 12 divisions which the German Command will be forced to reman. As a result of these operations, the present number of German divisions will be kept in Italy; besides, these divisions will be considerably weakened.
On the question of Turkey Brooke says that if the purely political considerations are left aside, Turkey’s entry into the war would be highly desirable from the purely military standpoint, and would yield great advantages. First, it would open the sea lanes through the Dardanelles. This would be of great significance in the sense of a possible withdrawal from the war by Rumania and Bulgaria. In ad- dition, contact could be established with the Russians across the Black Sea and supplies sent to Russia that way. Finally, the establishment of Allied air bases in Turkey would make possible raids on key German objectives, in particular the oil fields in Rumania, etc. The shorter route for cargoes across the Black Sea instead of the roundabout way via Per- sia would release tonnage that could be used elsewhere. To open the way to the Black Sea it would be enough to take several islands along the Turkish coast, beginning from the island of Rhodes. That will not be a difficult operation and will not entail the use of big forces. Brooke says that in the Mediterranean the British have special landing barges which
2-876 2
could be used for the operations he described. Operation Overlord would need to be postponed only for the period required for the use of these craft in the Mediterranean. At the same time these operations would hold up the German troops which could otherwise be used by the Germans dur- ing Operation Overlord. Brooke says that it is highly im- portant to ensure airfields in Italy in order to start raids on industry in Southern Germany. These air operations, to- gether with raids carried out from Britain, would be highly important for the conduct of the war in 1944. If the pro- posal made yesterday were accepted, to go on the defensive in Italy before the operation there is completed, it would be necessary to maintain large forces there in order to hold back the German troops. In consequence, only a limited force could be released for operations in Southern France. Brooke says that he is in full agreement with the strategy proposed by Marshal Stalin to deal the enemy a blow in two places. But this is easier done when the operations are developed on land, than when a sea landing is concerned. In that case two such operations are not always able to support each other because it is not easy to manage the alternation of reserves between the two groupings. If we were to land six or eight divisions in the south of France at present, the Ger- mans could easily cope with them. That is why it is neces- sary that the two operations should be undertaken closer in time to each other. But this will require a great number of landing facilities. Brooke says that the Allies had planned to carry out a small landing in the Mediterranean during Operation Overlord in order to draw off a part of the Ger- man forces from Overlord. But the difficulties lie in the timely reinforcement of such an auxiliary landing. The fact is that only three or four divisions could be landed right away, later to be brought up to the strength of 35. It is neces- sary that the Germans should not be able to increase their forces while the Allied force is still insignificant. Brooke says that that is all concerning land operations, and invites Air Force Marshal Portal to make a review of air operations.
Marshal Voroshilov says that it would be better to hear the American report on land operations, and then go on to air operations.
Marshall says that he wants to shed light on the military situation as it appears from the American standpoint. At present the Americans have to fight on two theatres of mil-
18
itary operations, namely, in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The main problem is that American operations extend over two such great oceans. In contrast to ordinary conditions the Americans do not have a shortage either of troops or supplies. Marshall says that apart from the divisions already in action, there are more than 50 divisions in the U.S.A. which the Americans would like to use as soon as possible. But the problem lies in tonnage and in landing craft. Mar- shall says that the Americans can still say that they have achieved considerable successes and are now prepared to intensify their pressure on the enemy. It is the desire of the Americans to put into action all their available forces as soon as possible. When mention is made of landing craft it concerns above all ships for the transfer of tanks and motor- ised units. That is just the kind of vessels lacking for the successful realisation of the operations in the Mediterranean of which General Brooke spoke. Marshall repeats that the Americans do not have any shortage either of troops or sup- plies. Marshall points out that the Americans are deeply interested in reducing transportation time and the stay of ships in ports. Marshall says that the advantage of Opera- tion Overlord is that it involves the shortest distance to be overcome at the initial moment. Subsequently, it is planned to transfer troops to France directly from the United States. About 60 American divisions are to be transferred to France. Marshall says that no definite decisions have yet been taken in respect of the Mediterranean, because the idea was to discuss this question at Tehran. The question now is what is to be done in the next three, and depending on that, the next six months. Marshall says that it is highly dangerous to undertake an operation in Southern France two months before Operation Overlord, but it is very true, at the same time, that an operation in Southern France would promote the success of Operation Overlord. Marshall thinks that the landing in Southern France should be carried out two or three weeks before Operation Overlord. It must be borne in mind that a serious obstacle to these operations will be the German destruction of all ports. For a long time the armies will have to be supplied across the open coast. American combat engineers have extensive experience in restoring ports, but Marshall nevertheless believes that there will be some delay. He says that during the landing at Salerno only 108 tons a day of supplies could be got through in the first
2° 19
18 days. Altogether 189,000 men were transferred across the open coast. It must also be borne in mind that this requires strong fighter cover from the air. Marshall says that at Sa- lerno the Anglo-American planes had only from 15 to 20 minutes of action. In Operation Overlord the planes may have up to 30 minutes. Marshall points out once again that the problem facing the Americans is not a shortage of troops or supplies, but a shortage of landing craft. Marshall says that he would like Marshal Voroshilov to understand that in the Pacific the Americans are now carrying out five landing operations accompanied by heavy air battles. Four other landing operations are to be undertaken in the course of January. Marshall says that that is all he wished to say.
Leahy suggests that Air Force Marshal Portal should add to the reports of Brooke and Marshall.
Marshal Portal declares that he will speak only of air operations. Up to now the main raids on Germany were car- ried out from Britain. Now such raids are being started also from the Mediterranean area. At present, the Anglo-Amer- icans are dropping from 15,000 to 30,000 tons of bombs on Germany a month, and their main purpose is to destroy the enemy’s industry, communications and air force. In addition, considerable numbers of German fighter planes are being destroyed from the air. There is a heavy struggle ahead but it can be safely said that the Anglo-American plan of de- stroying the German Air Force will be crowned with success. That the plan is being successfully implemented is evident from the deployment of the enemy’s forces. At present, there are from 1,650 to 1,700 fighters in Western and Southern Germany, while there are only 750 German fighters on all the other fronts. How sensitive the Germans are to the raids is evident from the fact that only one raid by the Anglo- American air force on Southern Germany, undertaken from the Mediterranean, forced the Germans to transfer 300 fighter planes from Central Germany. Portal says that he under- stands that Soviet aircraft is almost entirely engaged in land battles, but it would be well for the Soviet command to have the possibility of setting aside a part of the air force for bombing Eastern Germany. This would have a great effect on the situation on all the other fronts. Portal says that that is all he wished to say.
Leahy says that it would be well to hear the opinion of Marshal Voroshilov.
20
Voroshilov says that as he understood from General Mar- shall’s report, the Americans have from 50 to 60 divisions which they want to use in France, and the only delay is in transport and landing facilities. Voroshilov asks what is being done to solve the problem of transport and landing facilities.
Voroshilov says that he understood from General Mar- shall’s report that the Americans regard Operation Over- lord as the principal operation, and asks, whether General Brooke, as the chief of the British General Staff, also re- gards this operation as the principal one, and whether or not he considers that this operation could be replaced by another operation in the Mediterranean area or elsewhere.
Marshall says that he would like to reply to Marshal Voroshilov’s question about the preparations for Operation Overlord. Everything is now being done to carry out Oper- ation Overlord, but the whole question turns on transport and landing facilities. Marshall adds that while there was only one American division in Britain in August, at present there are already nine American divisions and more divi- sions are coming up.
Voroshilov refers to the reports made by Generals Dean and Ismey at the Moscow Conference, which said that there was large-scale construction of landing facilities in Britain and the United States, and that preparations were under way for the construction of temporary floating ports, and asks whether it can now be said that this construction will eventually ensure the necessary quantity of landing craft by the time Operation Overlord is to start.
Marshall replies that General Brooke can say more about the ports. As far as it concerns the United States, every- thing is being done to have all the necessary preparations completed by the start of Operation Overlord. In particular, landing barges, each to carry up to 40 tanks, are being readied.
Brooke says that he would first like to answer Marshal Voroshilov’s first question as to the view taken of Opera- tion Overlord by the British. Brooke says that the British attach great importance to this operation and regard it as an essential part of this war. But for the success of this operation there must be definite prerequisites, which would prevent the Germans from using the good roads of Northern France to bring up reserves. Brooke says that the British
21
believe such prerequisites will exist in 1944. All British forces were reorganised for the forthcoming operations. Special divisions are being trained for the purpose. At present, four divisions have already been transferred from Italy and Africa. A part of the landing ships has also been transferred from the Mediterranean. The British are doing everything to realise these operations, which must be car- ried out in the course of 1944. But the difficulties of the Anglo-Americans lie in landing ships. In order to be ready for May 1, the bulk of the landing ships should be trans- ferred from the Mediterranean now. But that would result in a suspension of operations in Italy. At the same time the British would like to keep the maximum number of German divisions in continuous action. That is required not only to draw off German forces from the Russian front, but also for the success of Operation Overlord. As for the construc- tion of temporary floating ports, Brooke says that experi- ments in that respect are now under way. Some of these experiments were not as successful as expected, but at any rate there is success in this matter. Brooke says that the suc- cess or failure of the forthcoming operation will depend by and large on the availability of these ports.
Voroshilov says that he wants to ask General Brooke once again whether the British regard Operation Overlord as the principal one.
Brooke says that he had expected this question. He, Brooke, must say that he would not like to see the failure of the operation either in Northern or in Southern France. But in certain circumstances these operations are doomed to failure.
Voroshilov says that Marshal Stalin and the Soviet General Staff regard the operations in the Mediterranean as of secondary significance. Marshal Stalin believes, how- ever, that an operation in Southern France, carried out two or three months before the operation in Northern France, could be of decisive significance for the success of Over- lord. The experience of the war, and the successes of the Anglo-American troops in North Africa and the landing operations in Italy, the operations of the Anglo-American air force against Germany, the organisational trim of the forces of the United States and the United Kingdom, the powerful equipment of the United States, the naval strength of the Allies and especially their superiority in the Medi-
22
terranean, show that given the will, Overlord can be a suc- cess. Will is the only thing required.
Voroshilov says that the military must plan operations in such a way that auxiliary operations, far from hindering the principal operation, should promote it in every way. Voroshilov then goes on to say that Marshal Stalin’s propos- al is to have the cross-Channel operation supported by the action of Allied forces in the south of France. With that aim in view he allows the possibility of going on the defen- sive in Italy, and of making a landing in Southern France with the forces released, so as to strike at the enemy from two sides. If the operation in Southern France cannot be carried out two or three months before Operation Overlord, Marshal Stalin does not insist on it at all. This landing can be carried out either simultaneously, or even somewhat later than Operation Overlord. But it must take place.
As for the operations of the Soviet Air Force, it is well known that it is engaged in combat operations together with the land forces. At present, there are on the Soviet- German front 210 German divisions alone, there being 260 enemy divisions altogether, as Marshal Stalin reported. The intensity of the combat operations has drawn our air force to the front and rear of the enemy, and we have no pos- sibility of using any air force for raids on Eastern Germany, but, of course, as soon as this becomes possible, our Su- preme Command will take a relevant decision.
Voroshilov says that we regard the operation across the Channel as not an easy one. We realise that this operation is more difficult than the forced crossing of rivers. Still, on the basis of our experience of the forced crossing of big rivers, such as the Dnieper, the Desna, and the Sozh, whose right bank is mountainous and in addition was well forti- fied by the Germans, we can say that the operation across the Channel, if it is carried out in earnest, will be a success. On the right bank of the above-mentioned rivers the Ger- mans built strong modern reinforced-concrete fortifications, armed them with powerful artillery, and were able to bring our low left bank under fire to a great depth, preventing our troops from approaching the river; still after concentrat- ed artillery, mine-thrower fire, after powerful strikes by the air force, our troops succeeded in crossing these rivers, and the enemy was routed.
I am sure, says Voroshilov, that if well prepared, and,
23
above all, if well supported by a strong air force, Operation Overlord will be crowned with full success. Needless to say, the Allied air force must secure full domination of the air before the land forces go into action.
Brooke says that the Anglo-Americans also regard the operations in the Mediterranean as operations of secondary importance. But since there are large forces in the Medi- terranean area, these operations can and must be carried out in order to help the principal operation. These opera- tions are closely bound up with the entire conduct of the war, and, in particular, with the success of the operation in Northern France.
Brooke says that in connection with Marshal Voroshilov’s remarks about the difficulty of the operation across the Channel he would like to say that the British watched the Red Army’s forcing of rivers with great interest and admi- ration. The British think that the Russians have achieved great successes in landing operations. But the cross-Channel operation requires special facilities and needs to be worked out in detail. For several years now the Anglo-Americans have been studying all the necessary details connected with this operation. There are considerable difficulties also in the fact that there are beaches on the shore of France, and big sand banks. That is why in many places ships find it hard to approach the shore itself. All this requires preparations.
Voroshilov says that in August or September the British held exercises in the Channel area. He, Voroshilov, would like to know how the British assess the results of these exercises.
Brooke replies that the purpose of these exercises was to bring about an air battle with the Germans. In addition, these exercises did a great deal for the training of the troops. It was not, of course, a landing exercise. Such exercises are carried out by the British on the coast of Britain.
Voroshilov asks how the Germans reacted to these manoeuvres.
Brooke replies that the Germans failed to react to these manoeuvres to the degree expected by the British.
Marshall says that he must raise an objection to Marshal Voroshilov’s statements on a cross-Channel landing. He, Marshall, was trained in land operations, he also had knowledge of the forced crossing of rivers, but when he came up against landing operations across the ocean, he had
24
to start all over again. For if a defeat of troops landed in a forced crossing of a river is only a setback, a defeat in a landing across the ocean is a disaster.
Voroshilov says that he does not agree with this. In such a serious operation as Overlord the main thing is organisa- tion, planning and well thought-out tactics. If the tactics accord with the set task, even a setback for the advance force will be only a setback, and not a disaster. The air force must win domination of the air and must crush the enemy’s artillery, and after the intensive artillery preparation only the advance force is to be sent out. After this force consol- idates its positions and appears to have succeeded, the main force is to be landed.
Marshall says that another thing that must be borne in mind here is that artillery support from the sea is more complicated than from the opposite bank of a river.
Voroshilov agrees with this and asks what is the expected ratio between the German and the Anglo-American air force by the start of the invasion.
Portal replies that it will be five or six to one.
Voroshilov says that agreement should be reached on the decision to be adopted at this conference.
Brooke says that he considers that not all the questions have yet been discussed at this conference, and therefore proposes that the conference be adjourned until tomorrow.
It is agreed to adjourn the session until November 30.
The talk continued for three hours.
The Second Sitting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain
Tehran, November 29, 1943 Opened: 16.00; Closed: 19.40
Roosevelt: | do not know what went on at the conference of the military this morning. I suggest therefore that Mar- shal Voroshilov, General Brooke and General Marshall should report to us on their work.
Stalin: I agree, but it appears that the military have not yet finished.
25
Churchill: 1 think it would still be useful to hear the military.
Brooke: Our conference today was not finished. We started out by examining possible military operations and their interrelation. We examined Operation Overlord and all the ensuing consequences. We concentrated on the period intervening from the present to the date of Operation Overlord; we took into account the fact that if we do not carry out active operations in the Mediterranean in this period before Operation Overlord, we shall be giving the Germans the possibility of transferring their troops to the Soviet-German front, or transferring them to the West with the aim of counteracting Overlord. We examined the pos- sibility of continuing our operations in Italy, where we are holding German divisions, and where we have concentrat- ed large forces. We then turned our attention to the East and examined the desirability of Turkey’s entry into the war, and the possible consequences this may have in terms of helping us to conduct the war and open the Dardanelles so as to supply the Soviet Union, and also of opening a way to the Balkans. We examined the possible operations in Southern France in combination with Operation Overlord. The Chief of Staff of the British Air Force reviewed the operations of the Anglo-American Air Force against Germany, and showed the effect of these operations on the over-all course of the war. General Marshall gave figures on the concentration of the American forces in Britain, and spoke of the preparations of the British troops for going over from the defensive to the offensive. The question of Overlord was also studied. Marshal Voroshilov asked sever- al questions which we tried to answer. Marshal Voroshilov set forth the view expressed by Marshal Stalin at the con- ference yesterday in respect of the operations to be carried out next year. That is about all we had time to examine at our sitting this morning.
Would General Marshall like to add anything to my report?
Marshall: There remains little for me to add to what has been said by General Brooke. His report was sufficiently detailed. The problem facing the Americans is not man power but tonnage, special landing facilities and also the availability of air bases sufficiently close to the area of operations. When |] say landing facilities, | mean special
26
landing craft capable of carrying up to 40 tanks or vehicles. It is precisely the number of these vessels that is limited. The transfer of American troops, equipment and ammunition to Britain is proceeding according to plan. One million tons of various equipment has already been transported to Brit- ain. But landing facilities remain the limiting factor. We have a plan for the manufacture of landing facilities, which was expanded both in the United States and in Britain. The accelerated production of landing facilities will result in an increase of their number for invasion across the Chan- nel and for operations in the Mediterranean. In short, prep- arations for Overlord are proceeding according to plan, insofar as materiel and personnel are concerned. The prob- lem is mainly transport and the distribution of landing facilities. As General Brooke has explained, several divi- sions have already been transferred from Italy.
Voroshilov: The reports of Generals Brooke and Marshall correspond to the talk we had this morning. My questions were intended to specify the technical preparations for Oper- ation Overlord and they were answered in the manner now set forth by General Marshall. We made no effort to specify the dates for Operation Overlord and all the details connected with the operation considering that these ques- tions could be dealt with at our next meeting if it is held.
Stalin: If possible I should like to know who will be appointed to command Operation Overlord.
Roosevelt: This matter has not yet been decided.
Stalin: In that case nothing will come of Operation Overlord. Who bears the moral and military responsibility for the preparation and execution of Operation Overlord? If that is unknown, then Operation Overlord is just so much talk.
Roosevelt: The British General Morgan is responsible for preparing Operation Overlord.
Stalin: Who is responsible for carrying out Operation Overlord?
Roosevelt: We know the men who will take part in car- rying out Operation Overlord, with the exception of the commander-in-chief of the operation.
Stalin: It may happen that General Morgan will consider the operation prepared, but after the appointment of the commander responsible for the execution of the operation it may turn out that the commander will consider the opera-
27
tion unprepared. There must be some one who is responsible both for preparing and executing the operation.
Churchill: General Morgan was given the assignment of preliminary preparations.
Stalin: Who gave General Morgan this assignment?
Churchill: Several months ago the assignment was given to General Morgan by the Joint Anglo-American Staff with the consent of the President and with my consent. General Morgan was assigned to carry out preparations for Overlord together with the American and British staffs, but the com- mander-in-chief has not yet been appointed. The British Government has expressed its readiness to place its forces under the command of an American commander-in-chief in Operation Overlord, because the United States is respon- sible for the concentration and remanning of forces and has a greater number of forces. On the other hand, the British Government proposed the appointment of a British com- mander-in-chief of operations in the Mediterranean, where the British have a greater number of forces. The question of appointing a commander-in-chief cannot be solved at such a broad sitting as today’s. This question should be decided by the three heads of Government among themselves, in private. As the President has just told me—and | confirm this—the decision on the appointment of a com- mander-in-chief will depend on the talks we are now having.
Stalin: 1 should like to be understood that the Russians do not claim participation in the appointment of the com- mander-in-chief, but the Russians would like to know who is going to be the commander. The Russians would like him to be appointed sooner, and would like to see him respon- sible for the preparations as well as for the carrying out of Operation Overlord.
Churchill: We fully agree with what Marshal Stalin has said and I think the President will agree with me if I say that we shall appoint a commander-in-chief in a fortnight, and shall communicate his name. One of the tasks of the conference is to appoint a commander-in-chief.
Stalin: I have no questions in connection with the reports of Brooke and Marshall.
Churchill: | am somewhat worried by the number and complexity of the problems facing us. This conference is unique. Millions of people look to this conference and place
28
their hopes on it, and I very much wish that we should not part until we have reached agreement on political and milit- ary questions we have been trusted to solve. Today, I want to indicate several points requiring study in a subcommit- tee. The British Staff and I have long been studying the situation in the Mediterranean, where we have quite a big army. We want this army to be in action there in the course of the whole year and to be independent of factors that would force it to be idle. In this connection we ask our Russian allies to examine the whole problem and the various alternatives we shall propose to them as to the best use of our available forces in the Mediterranean area.
There are three questions which require detailed study.
The first of these is, of course, the assistance that can be given to Operation Overlord with the use of the forces in the Mediterranean area. What I mean is the scale of the operations which are to be carried out in Southern France from Northern Italy. The President and I spoke of this yesterday. I do not think the matter has been studied suf- ficiently to allow a final decision. I should welcome a study of this question by our staffs from the standpoint of its urgency. In this connection Marshal Stalin correctly stressed the importance of a flanking movement in Southern France. The date is important. If operations with smaller forces are started at one point and with bigger forces at another, the first operation will be a failure. Our staffs should discuss the operations on a broader plane. I should like to have enough landing facilities in the Mediterranean to transfer two divisions. If these two divisions are avail- able we could undertake an operation to help the advance of the Anglo-American troops along the Italian Peninsula in order to destroy the enemy forces there. There is another possibility of using these forces. They would be sufficient for the capture of the island of Rhodes in the event Turkey entered the war. The third possibility of using these forces is that, minus their losses, they could be used in Southern France in six months to support Operation Overlord. None of these possibilities is excluded. But the matter of the date is important. The use of these two divisions, no matter for which of the three operations I have indicated they might be used in the Mediterranean, cannot be carried out without deferring Operation Overlord, or without diverting a part of the landing facilities from the area of the Indian
29
Ocean. There is our dilemma. In order to decide which way to choose we should like to hear the view of Marshal Stalin concerning the over-all strategic situation, because we are delighted and inspired by the military experience of our Russian allies. I should like to propose that the study of the question I have raised be continued by our military committee tomorrow.
The next problem I want to speak of is political rather than military, because the military forces we intend to set aside for its solution are insignificant. | have in mind the Balkans. In the Balkans there are 21 German divisions apart from garrison troops. Of this number, i.e., of the 21 divi- sions, 54,000 German troops are concentrated in the Aegean islands. In addition, there are not less than 12 Bulgarian divisions in the Balkans. Altogether, there are 42 enemy divisions in the Balkans. If Turkey should enter the war the Bulgarians would be forced to withdraw their troops to the front in Thrace against Turkey. This will result in an in- creased danger to the German divisions in the Balkans. I give these figures to show the enormous importance of this factor in the Balkans, where we do not intend to send our regular divisions and where we intend to limit ourselves to raids by combined detachments. In the Balkans we have neither interests nor ambitions. All we want to do is to tie down the 21 German divisions in the Balkans and to destroy them, if possible. I propose, therefore, that a meeting should be held today of the two Foreign Ministers and a representative appointed by the President to discuss the political aspect of this question. We want to work concert- edly with our Russian allies. If there are any difficulties, they can be cleared up between ourselves. The military questions could be discussed later.
] pass now to the next question, the question of Turkey. We British are Turkey’s allies, and we have assumed the responsibility of trying to convince or make Turkey enter the war before Christmas. If the President should like to join us or to assume the leadership, that will be acceptable to us, but we shall need the full help of Marshal Stalin in implementing the decision adopted at the Moscow Confer- ence. On behalf of the British Government I can say that it is prepared to warn Turkey that if Turkey does not accept the proposal of entering the war this may have the most serious political consequences for Turkey and have an
80
effect on her rights in respect of the Bosporus and the Dar- danelles. This morning, the military committee composed of our generals discussed the military aspect of the Turkish problem, but the problem of Turkey is a political rather than a military problem. We intend to set aside not more than two or three divisions for operations in the area of Turkey if she enters the war, apart from the air force that we Shall also make available.
I have raised several questions which are mainly polit- ical, for example, the question of what the Soviet Govern- ment thinks about Bulgaria, whether it is inclined, in the event that Turkey declares war on Germany and Bulgaria attacks Turkey, to tell the Bulgarians that it will regard Bulgaria as its enemy. This will have a great effect on Bul- garia. There are other political problems as well. | propose that the two Foreign Ministers and a representative appoint- ed by the President should study this question and advise us on how to make Turkey enter the war and what the results of this will be. I think these results will be enor- mous with decisive possibilities. If Turkey declares war on Germany it will be a great blow for the German people. If we manage to make good use of this fact it should neu- tralise Bulgaria. As for the other countries in the Balkans, Rumania is already looking for a country to which she can capitulate. Hungary is also in confusion. It is time for us to reap the harvest. Now we must pay the price for this harvest, if we consider it expedient. | propose that these questions should be discussed by our three representatives, who, as a result of their discussion, may tell us what can be done to lighten Russia’s burden, and to ensure the suc- cess of Operation Overlord.
Stalin: As for the two divisions which Mr. Churchill proposes to set aside for help to Turkey and the partisans, we have no disagreements on this question. We regard the assignment of two divisions and help to the partisans as important. But if we are prevailed upon here to discuss military questions, we regard Operation Overlord as the main and decisive question.
I should like the military committee to have a definite task. I propose that the committee be given a definite direc- tive within whose framework it could work. Of course, the Russians are in need of help. I should like to state that if the question is one of aid to us, we do expect aid from
31
those who carry out the operations planned, and we expect real aid.
What should our directives to the military committee be? They should stipulate that the date of Operation Overlord should not be postponed, and that May should be the time limit for carrying out this operation. Our second directive should stipulate, in conformity with the desires of the Rus- sians, support of Operation Overlord by a landing in the south of France. If it is impossible to land a force in South- ern France two or three months before the start of Oper- ation Overlord, it would be worth while doing this simultaneously with Operation Overlord. If transport dif- ficulties do not allow a landing in Southern’ France simultaneously with Operation Overlord, the operation in Southern France could be undertaken some time after the start of Operation Overlord. I think that a landing in Southern France would be an auxiliary operation in respect of Overlord. This operation would ensure the success of Operation Overlord. Meanwhile, the operation to take Rome would be of a diverting nature. The third directive would instruct the committee to hurry the appointment of the commander-in-chief for Operation Overlord. It would be best to settle these matters during our stay here, and I see no reason why this cannot be done. We believe that until a commander-in-chief is appointed Operation Over- lord cannot be expected to be a success. The appointment of a commander-in-chief is the task of the British and the Americans, but the Russians would like to know who is going to be the commander-in-chief. Those are the three direc- tives to the military committee. If the committee works within the framework of these directives its work can be successful and can be finished earlier. I ask the conference to take account of the considerations I have put forward.
Roosevelt: I listened with interest to everything that was said, beginning from Operation Overlord and ending with the question of Turkey. I attach great importance to dates. If there is agreement on Operation Overlord, there is need to come to agreement on the date of this operation.
Operation Overlord can be carried out in the first week of May or it may be postponed somewhat. The postpone- ment of Overlord would result from our carrying out one or two operations in the Mediterranean, which would require landing facilities and planes. If an expedition is carried
32
out in the eastern part of the Mediterranean and fails it will be necessary to transfer additional materiel and troops to that area. In that case Overlord will not be carried out in time.
Stalin: Against Yugoslavia the Germans have eight divi- sions, of which five are in Greece. In Bulgaria, there are three or four German divisions, and nine in Italy.
Churchill: Our figures differ from these.
Stalin: Your figures are wrong. In France, the Germans have 25 divisions.
Roosevelt: Our staffs must work out plans in order to tie down the German divisions in the Balkans. These plans must be worked out in such a way that the operations we undertake for that purpose should not prejudice Overlord.
Stalin: That is right.
Churchill: Speaking of measures with respect to the Bal- kans, I did not mean the use of large forces for these pur- poses.
Stalin: If possible it would be good to carry out Opera- tion Overlord in May, say the 10th, 15th, or 20th of May.
Churchill: | cannot undertake such an obligation.
Stalin: If Overlord is carried out in August, as Churchill said yesterday, nothing will come of the operation because of the unfavourable weather in that period. April and May are the best months for Overlord.
Churchill: | do not think that we differ in our views, as it may seem. I am prepared to do everything that is within the power of the British Government to carry out Opera- tion Overlord at the earliest possible date. But I do not think that the many possibilities available in the Mediterranean should be coldly rejected as being of no importance, just because their use will hold up Operation Overlord for two or three months.
Stalin: The operations in the Mediterranean of which Churchill speaks are merely diversional. I do not deny the importance of these diversions.
Churchill: In our opinion the numerous British troops must not be idle for six months. They should carry on operations against the enemy, and with the help of our American allies we hope to destroy the German divisions in Italy. We cannot remain passive in Italy, for that will spoil our whole campaign there. We must extend assist- ance to our Russian friends.
3-876 38
Stalin: According to Churchill it would appear that the Russians want the British to be idle.
Churchill: If the vessels are withdrawn from the Mediter- ranean, this will considerably reduce the scale of operations in that area. Marshal Stalin will recall that at the Moscow Conference conditions were specified under which Operation Overlord can be a success. These conditions stipulate that by the time of the invasion there should be not more than 12 German mobile divisions in France, and that in the course of 60 days the Germans should be unable to transfer _ more than 15 divisions to reinforce their troops in France. There is no mistake here, for these conditions are the basis of Overlord. We must tie down as many German divisions as possible in Italy, the Balkans, and in the area of Turkey, if she enters the war. German divisions transferred from France are fighting us at the front in Italy. If we are pas- sive on the front in Italy, the Germans will be able to transfer their divisions back to France to the prejudice of Overlord. That is why we must tie up the enemy by action and keep our front in Italy in an active state so as to pin down a sufficient number of German _ divisions there.
As for Turkey, I agree to insist on her entry into the war. If she refuses to do this, nothing can be done about it. If she does agree we must make use of the Turkish air bases in Anatolia and take Rhodes. One assault division will be enough for this operation. Subsequently, the garrison in the island will be able to defend it. Having received Rhodes and the Turkish bases we shall be able to expel the German garrisons from the other islands of the Aegean Sea and open up the Dardanelles. That is not an operation that will require a great force. It is a limited operation. If Turkey enters the war and we take Rhodes we shall have secured superiority in this area and the time will come when all the islands in the Aegean Sea will be ours. If Turkey does not enter the war we shall not grieve over the matter and I shall not ask for troops to take Rhodes and the islands of the Aegean Sea. But in that case Germany will not grieve either, for she will continue to dominate the area. If Turkey enters the war, our troops stationed in Egypt for the pur- poses of defence, and our air force there also defending Egypt, could be advanced to the fore. After the taking of the Aegean Islands these forces could be used in areas north
34),
of Egypt. I suggest a thorough discussion of this question. It will be a great misfortune for us, if Turkey does not join the war, from the standpoint of Germany’s continued domi- nation of that area. I want the troops and planes now idle in Egypt to be used as soon as possible if Turkey enters the war. Everything depends on the landing facilities. The dif- ficulty lies in the transportation of troops across the sea. I am always prepared to discuss all details with our Allies. But everything depends on the availability of landing facil- ities. If these landing facilities are left in the Mediterra- nean or in the Indian Ocean to the prejudice of Overlord, then the success of Overlord and the success of the opera- tion in Southern France cannot be guaranteed. The opera- tions in Southern France will require a great quantity of landing facilities. J ask this to be taken into consideration.
Finally, I consider acceptable and, on behalf of the British Government, agree to the working out of directives for the military committee. 1 suggest that we work out our own directives to the committee together with the Ameri- cans. I think that our views coincide more or less.
Stalin: How long do we intend to stay at Tehran?
Churchill: 1 am prepared to stop eating until these direc- tives are worked out.
Stalin: What I mean is when shall we end our confer- ence?
Roosevelt: | am prepared to stay at Tehran as long as Marshal Stalin remains at Tehran.
Churchill: If it is necessary I am prepared to stay in Tehran for good.
Stalin: | should like to know how many French divisions there are at present.
Roosevelt: The plan is to arm 11 French divisions. But of this number only five are ready now, and another four divisions are to be equipped shortly. ae Are these French divisions in action or are they idle?
Roosevelt: One division is fighting in Italy, one or two divisions are in Corsica and Sardinia.
Stalin: How does the command intend to use these French divisions?
Marshall: The plan is to merge the French Corps with the Fifth Army operating on the left flank in Italy. One division is now being transferred to the front in Italy where
35
it will be tested in action. After this a decision will be taken on the most expedient use of the French divisions. The time required to equip another four French divisions depends on the time it will take to train the personnel of these divisions.
Stalin: Are these divisions of the French type?
Marshall: These divisions are of the American type and consist of 15,000 men each. Most of the soldiers are not Frenchmen. In the armoured divisions, three-quarters of the personnel are French and the rest are Africans.
Roosevelt: 1 should like to say a few words. I think that if we three give instructions to our military committee it will be able to discuss these questions.
Stalin: There is no need for any military committee. We can solve all the questions here at the conference. We must decide on the date, the commander-in-chief and the need of an auxiliary operation in Southern France. We Russians are limited in time of stay at Tehran. We could stay on until December 1, but we have to leave on the 2nd. The President will recall that we agreed on three or four days.
Roosevelt: 1 think that my proposal will simplify the work of the staff. The military committee must take Opera- tion Overlord as a basis. The committee must table its proposals on the auxiliary operations in the Mediterranean. It must also bear in mind that these operations may hold up Overlord.
Stalin: The Russians would like to know the date on which Overlord is to start in order to prepare their blow at the Germans.
Roosevelt: The date of Operation Overlord was deter- mined at Quebec. Only the most serious changes in the situation can justify any changes in the date determined for this operation.
Churchill: | have just heard the directive which the President proposed to give the committee. I should like to have the opportunity of considering the President’s proposals. I have no objections to this in principle, but I should like to have time to examine the President’s proposals. I am very pleased to spend December | at Tehran, and to leave on December 2. It is not clear to me whether or not the President proposes the establishment of a military commit- tee, for Marshal Stalin suggests that we do without a com- mittee. Personally, I want such a committee.
36
As for determining the date of Operation Overlord, if it is decided to have an examination of strategic questions in the military committee. ...
Stalin: We are not demanding any examination.
Roosevelt: We are all aware that the contradictions between us and the British are small. I object to the postponement of Operation Overlord, while Churchill Jays emphasis on the importance of operations in the Medi- terranean. The military committee could clear up these questions.
Stalin: We can solve these problems ourselves, because we have more rights than the military committee. If I may permit myself an incautious question, I should like to know whether the British believe in Operation Overlord or simply speak of it to reassure the Russians.
Churchill: Given the conditions which were indicated at the Moscow Conference, I am quite sure that we shall have to transfer all our available forces against the Germans when Operation Overlord is launched.
Roosevelt: We are very hungry now, and I propose that we adjourn to attend the dinner given for us today by Marshal Stalin. I propose that our military committee should continue its conference tomorrow morning.
Stalin: There is no need for the meeting of a military committee. That is superfluous. Only we ourselves can speed up our work.
Churchill: Would it be better for the President and myself to co-ordinate our views and then report to you our common standpoint?
Stalin: This would accelerate our work.
Churchill: And what about the committee consisting of Hopkins and the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs?
Stalin: This committee is not required either. But if Mr. Churchill insists, we do not object to its formation.
Roosevelt: Tomorrow, Hopkins, Molotov and Eden could have talk with each other at luncheon.
Stalin: What are we going to do tomorrow? Will the proposals of Churchill and Roosevelt be ready?
Roosevelt: The proposals will be ready, and I suggest that Churchill, Marshal Stalin and I have luncheon at one- thirty and discuss all questions.
Churchill; That will be our programme for tomorrow.
Stalin: I agree.
37
The Third Sitting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain
Tehran, November 30, 1943 Opened: 16.30; Closed: 17.20
Roosevelt: The decision of the British and American staffs was communicated to Marshal Stalin and has satis- fied him. It would be desirable for General Brooke to an- nounce this decision to the conference if Marshal Stalin has no objections.
Stalin: I agree.
Churchill: General Brooke will make this announcement on behalf of both the Americans and the British.
Brooke: The chiefs of the Joint Staffs have advised the President and the Prime Minister to inform Marshal Stalin that Operation Overlord will be started in May. This oper- ation will be supported by an operation against Southern France, with the scale of this operation depending on the number of landing craft available at the time.
Churchill: Needless to say the Joint British and American Staffs will be in close contact with Marshal Stalin in order to permit the co-ordination of operations by all the allies, so that a blow is dealt at the enemy simultaneously from both sides.
Stalin: I am aware of the importance of the decisions adopted by the staffs of our allies, and the difficulties in implementing these decisions. There may be a danger not at the start of Overlord but when the operation is unfold- ed, when the Germans try to transfer a part of their troops from the Eastern Front to the Western to hamper Over- lord. In order to prevent the Germans from manoeuvring their reserves and transferring any sizable forces from the Eastern Front to the West, the Russians undertake to organ- ise a big offensive against the Germans in several places by May, in order to pin down the German divisions on the Eastern Front and to prevent the Germans from creating any difficulties for Overlord. I informed President Roose- velt and Prime Minister Churchill of this today, but I wish to repeat my statement before the conference.
Roosevelt: I am highly satisfied with Marshal Stalin’s
38
statement that steps will be taken to co-ordinate the blows at the enemy. I hope that our nations have now realised the need of joint action, and that the forthcoming opera- tions of our three countries will show that we have learned to act together.
The United States has not yet appointed a commander- in-chief for Operation Overlord, but I am sure that a com- mander-in-chief will be appointed in the next three or four days, as soon as we return to Cairo.
I have only one proposal to make, namely, that our staffs should without delay start elaborating the proposals adopt- ed here. That is why I suppose they could return to Cairo tomorrow, if Marshal Stalin has no objections to this.
Stalin: I agree with this.
Churchill: I want to say that today we adopted a serious decision. Now the President and I and our staffs must work out this question in detail and decide where we are to find the necessary landing craft. We have ahead of us five months, and I think that we shall be able to obtain the required number of landing craft. I have already given an assignment to study this matter and a detailed report will be submitted as soon as our staffs return home. For Opera- tion Overlord to succeed we must have a considerable su- periority of forces, and I hope that our staffs will be able to assure this. By June, we shall already be in bitter action against the enemy. I believe that we have finished discuss- ing military matters. We could now discuss political ques- tions. For this we could use December 1 and 2, and could leave on December 3. We have scored a great success and it would be well if we left after solving all questions, and announced to the public that we have reached complete agreement. I hope that the President can stay until Decem- ber 3, as I can, if Marshal Stalin agrees to stay.
Stalin: I agree.
Roosevelt: | am very happy to hear that Marshal Stalin has agreed to stay for another day. I also wanted to say about the communiqué: our staffs could give us a draft of this communiqué.
Stalin: In the part relating to military matters?
Churchill: Of course. The communiqué must be brief and mystifying.
Stalin: But without any mysticism.
Churchill: 1 am sure that the enemy will shortly learn
39
of our preparations because he will be able to discover them by the great accumulation of trains, by the activity of our ports, etc.
Stalin: A big operation cannot be hidden in a sack.
Churchill: Our staffs will have to think how to camou- flage these preparations and to mislead the enemy.
Stalin: In such cases we mislead the enemy by building dummies of tanks, planes, and mock airfields. Then we set the dummies of the tanks and planes in motion with the aid of tractors. Intelligence reports on these movements to the enemy, and the Germans believe that the blow is being prepared in that very place. Meanwhile, there is absolute quiet where the offensive is really being staged. All trans- portation takes place at night. We set up in several places from 5,000 to 8,000 dummies of tanks, up to 2,000 dummies of planes, and a great number of dummy airfields. In addi- tion, we mislead the enemy with the aid of the radio. In areas where no offensive is planned, radio stations exchange messages. These stations are monitored by the enemy, and he receives the impression that a great force is deployed there. Enemy planes often bomb these places night and day although they are absolutely empty.
Churchill: Sometimes truth has to be safeguarded with the aid of untruth. In any case, steps will be taken to mislead the enemy.
The Fourth Sitting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain
Tehran, December 1, 1943
1, SITTING DURING LUNCHEON Opened: 13.00; Closed: 15.00
Hopkins: The question of inviting Turkey to enter the war is connected with the question of how much support Turkey can get from Great Britain and the United States. In addition, it is necessary to co-ordinate Turkey’s entry into the war with the over-all strategy.
40
=
Roosevelt: In other words, Inonti is going to ask us wheth- er we shall support Turkey. I think this question must be further worked out.
Stalin: Churchill said that the British Government was making available 20 or 30 squadrons and 2 or 3 divisions for aid to Turkey.
Churchill: We gave no consent in respect of two or three divisions. In Egypt, we have 17 squadrons which are not used at present by the Anglo-American command. These squadrons, in the event of Turkey’s entry into the war, would serve for the purpose of her defence. In addition, Britain agreed to make available to Turkey three anti-air- craft defence regiments. That is all the British promised Turkey. The British did not promise Turkey any troops. The Turks have 50 divisions. The Turks are good fighters, but they have no modern weapons. As for the two or three divisions mentioned by Marshal Stalin the British Govern- ment has set these divisions aside for the capture of the Aegean Islands in the event Turkey enters the war, and not for aid to Turkey.
Roosevelt: (addressing Churchill): Isn't it a fact that the operation against Rhodes will require a great quantity of landing facilities.
Churchill: This operation will require no more facilities than are available in the Mediterranean.
Roosevelt: My difficulty is that the American Staff has not yet studied how many landing craft will be required by the operations in Italy, the preparations of Overlord in Britain, and for the Indian Ocean. That is why I must be careful in respect of promises to Turkey. I’m afraid these promises may hamper the fulfilment of our agreement of yesterday.
Stalin: Apart from entering the war, Turkey will also make her territory available to the allied air force.
Churchill: Of course.
Stalin: I think that we have finished with this question.
Churchill: We have not offered anything we are unable to give. We offered the Turks three new squadrons of fighters to bring the total number of squadrons, including those in Egypt, up to 20. Perhaps, the Americans could add anything to this number? We promised the Turks some anti-aircraft defence units, but we did not promise them any troops, for we haven’t any. As for landing facilities,
41
these will be needed in March, but I believe we shall be able to find them in the period between the taking of Rome and the start of Operation Overlord.
Roosevelt: | want to consult with the military. I hope Churchill is right, but my advisers say that there may be difficulties in the use of landing craft between the taking of Rome and the start of Overlord. They believe that it is absolutely necessary to have the landing craft for Opera- tion Overlord by April 1.
Churchill: 1 do not see any difficulties. We have not made any proposals to Turkey, and I don’t know if Inonii will accept them. He will be in Cairo and will acquaint himself with the situation. I can give the Turks 20 squad- rons. I won’t give the Turks any troops. Besides, I don’t think they need troops. But the point is that I don’t know whether or not Inonii is coming to Cairo.
Stalin: He might fall ill?
Churchill: Easily. If Indnii does not agree to go to Cairo to meet the President and myself, I am prepared to go on a cruiser to see him in Adana. Inonii will go there, and I shall paint for him the unpleasant picture that will face the Turks if they refuse to enter the war, and the pleasant picture in the opposite case. I shall then inform you of the results of my talks with Inénii.
Hopkins: The question of supporting Turkey in the war was not discussed by the American military, and 1 doubt the expediency of inviting Inonti to Cairo before the mili- tary have studied this matter.
Stalin: Consequently, Hopkins proposes not to invite TInonii.
Hopkins: 1 am not proposing not to invite Inoni, but I stress that it would be useful to receive information before- hand on the aid we could give the Turks.
Churchill: I agree with Hopkins. We must agree on the possible aid to the Turks.
Stalin: Can’t this be done without the military?
Churchill: Together with the military we must study the question of landing facilities. We may be able to get more than we hope by taking them from the Indian or Pacific oceans or building them. If that is impossible we should abandon the idea. However, in any case, it has been decid- ed that Overlord must not suffer.
Roosevelt: | think that it would be useful if I outlined the
42
situation in the Pacific in connection with the possible with- drawal of landing facilities from there, as Churchill sug- gests. J must point out, first, that the distance from the Pacific to the Mediterranean is enormous. Second, in the Pacific we are moving northwards so as to cut Japanese communications, and we need landing facilities in that area.
Hopkins: Is it true that Churchill and Eden have not spoken to the Turks about the taking of the Aegean Islands?
Eden: No, I have not spoken of this. I only asked the Turks to make available air bases and did not touch upon the question of landing facilities.
Roosevelt: If I see the Turkish President I shall make the offer to take Crete and the Dodecanese Islands because they are rather close to Turkey.
Churchill: I want the Turks to give us air bases in the area of Smyrna, which the British helped the Turks to build. When we get these air bases we shall expel the German air force from the Islands. For this purpose we are prepared to pay with one of our planes for every destroyed German plane. The task of expelling the German garrisons from the Islands will be feasible if we ensure air superiority in that area. There is no need to storm the island of Rhodes where there are 8,000 Italians and 5,000 Germans. They can be starved out. If we get bases in Turkey our ships with air support will be able to cut German communica- tions and the goal will be reached.
Stalin: That is correct. It seems that the 20 squadrons now in Cairo are idle. If they go into action nothing will be left of the German air force. But a certain number of bombers should be added to the fighter squadrons.
Roosevelt: | agree with Churchill’s proposal to make available for Turkey’s defence 20 squadrons with a certain number of bombers.
Churchill: We are offering Turkey limited air cover and anti-aircraft defence. It is winter now, and an invasion of Turkey is improbable. We intend to continue supplying Turkey with arms. Turkey is receiving mainly American weapons. At the present time we are offering Turkey the invaluable opportunity of accepting the Soviet Govern- ment’s invitation to take part in a peace conference.
Stalin: What kind of weapons is Turkey short of?
Churchill: The Turks have rifles, pretty good artillery, but they have no anti-tank artillery, no air force, no tanks.
43
We organised military schools in Turkey, but attendance is low. The Turks have no experience in handling radio equipment. But the Turks are good fighters.
Stalin: It is quite possible that if the Turks give airfields to the allies, Bulgaria will not attack Turkey, and the Ger- mans will be expecting Turkey’s attack. Turkey will not attack the Germans, but will simply be in a state of war with them. But this will give the allies airfields and ports in Turkey. If events took such a turn, that would not be bad either.
Eden: | told the Turks that they could make air bases available to the allies without fighting, for Germany would not attack Turkey.
Roosevelt: In this respect Portugal could serve as an example for Turkey.
Eden: Numan would not agree with my standpoint. He said Germany would react, and that Turkey prefers to enter the war of her own free will, instead of being dragged in.
Churchill: That is true. But I must say the following. When you ask Turkey to stretch her neutrality by giving us air bases, the Turks reply that they prefer a war in earnest; when you tell the Turks about entering the war in earnest, they reply that they have not got the arms. If the Turks give a negative reply to our proposal we must let them know our serious considerations. We must tell them that in that case they will not participate in the peace con- ference. As for Britain, we shall tell them on our part that we are not interested in Turkish affairs. In addition, we shall stop supplying Turkey with arms.
Eden: | should like to specify the demands we are to present to Turkey in Cairo. J understand that we must de- mand of the Turks entry into the war against Germany.
Stalin: Precisely, against Germany... .
Il. ROUND-TABLE SITTING Opened: 16.00; Closed: 19.40 Roosevelt: At this sitting I should like us to discuss the questions of Poland and Germany. Stalin: And also the question of a communiqué.
Roosevelt: The Communiqué is already being prepared.
44
Molotov: Can we receive an answer now concerning the transfer to us of a part of the Italian merchant fleet and navy?
Roosevelt: The answer to this question is very simple. We have received a great number of Italian ships. They should, 1 think, remain in the temporary use of the United Nations and should be used in the best way. After the war they should be distributed among the United Nations.
Molotov: If these ships cannot be conveyed into our ownership we ask that they be given to us for temporary use. We shall use them in the interests of the allies and all the United Nations.
Stalin: If Turkey does not enter the war, the Italian ships transferred to us cannot be sailed into the Black Sea, and we should then like to have them in the North Sea. We are aware that Great Britain and the United States are in need of ships, but we are not asking for many.
Churchill: | am for it.
Roosevelt: J am also for it.
Churchill: 1 should like to see these ships in the Black Sea.
Stalin: We also prefer to have them in the Black Sea.
Churchill: It may be well to send the Italian ships handed over to the Soviet Union into the Black Sea with the British ships to help the Soviet Navy.
Stalin: All right, please.
Churchill: We must settle the matter of transferring the ships with the Italians, because they are helping us with their fleet. Some Italian ships are fighting, others are patrol- ling. The submarines are being used for supply. Of course, it is desirable to put the Italian fleet to the best possible use instead of having it against us. That is why I request two months in which to settle with the Italians the question of transferring the Italian ships to the Soviet Union. This is a delicate matter and it is necessary to go about it like a cat with a mouse.
Stalin: Can we then receive these ships by the end of January of next year?
Roosevelt: J agree.
Churchill: 1 agree.
Stalin: Our crews will man these ships.
Churchill: We should like to help the Russian Navy in the Black Sea with our own ships. In addition, we should
45
be happy to help in repairing the Soviet naval bases in the Black Sea, for instance, Sevastopol. We should also be happy if the Soviet Government considers it useful to send four or five submarines into the Black Sea to sink the Rumanians and Germans there. I must say that we have neither claims nor interests in the Black Sea.
Stalin: Very well, we shall be grateful for any assistance extended to us.
Churchill: There is one point we could make use of in the event Turkey joins the war. If Turkey is afraid to enter the war but will agree to stretch her neutrality, Turkey may permit several submarines to pass through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles into the Black Sea with supply ships for them. American submarines are sinking many Japanese ships in the Pacific Ocean; our submarines sank a great number of German and Italian ships in the Mediterranean; now our submarines could help in the Black Sea.
Stalin: Have we finished with this question?
Churchill: Yes.
Roosevelt: I should like to discuss Poland. I wish to ex- press the hope that the Soviet Government will be able to start talks and restore its relations with the Polish Govern- ment.
Stalin: The agents of the Polish Government, who are in Poland, are connected with the Germans. They are killing partisans. You cannot imagine what they are doing there.
Churchill: That is a big issue. We declared war on Ger- many because Germany attacked Poland. I was surprised when Chamberlain failed to fight for the Czechs in Munich, but suddenly in April 1939 gave Poland a guarantee. I was surprised when he rejected more favourable opportunities and returned to the policy of war. But at the same time I was also pleased with this fact. For the sake of Poland and in pursuance of our promise we declared war on Germany, although we were not prepared, with the exception of our naval forces, and played a big part in inducing France to enter the war. France has collapsed. But we turned out to be active fighters thanks to our insular position. We attach great importance to the reason for which we entered the war. I understand the historical difference between ours and the Russian standpoint on Poland. But at home we pay a great deal of attention to Poland, for it was the attack on Poland that prompted us to undertake the present effort. I
46
a
was also very well aware of the Russian position at the start of the war, and considering our weakness at the beginning of the war, and the fact that France went back on the guar- antees she gave in Munich, I understand that the Soviet Government could not at the time risk its life in that strug- gle. But now the situation is different, and I hope that if we are asked why we entered the war we shall reply that it happened because we gave Poland a guarantee. I want to return to my example of the three matches, one of which represents Germany, another Poland, and the third, the Soviet Union. All these three matches must be moved to the West in order to settle one of the main problems facing the allies: to ensure the Soviet Union’s Western borders.
Stalin: Yesterday there was no mention of negotiations with the Polish Government. Yesterday it was said that the Polish Government must be directed to do this, and that. I must say that Russia, no less than the other Powers, is interested in good relations with Poland, because Poland is Russia’s neighbour. We stand for the restoration and strength- ening of Poland. But we draw a line between Poland and the emigre Polish Government in London. We broke off relations with that Government not out of any whim on our part, but because the Polish Government joined Hitler in slandering the Soviet Union. All that was published in the press. What are the guarantees that the emigre Polish Government in London will not do the same thing again? We should like to have a guarantee that the agents of the Polish Government will not kill partisans, that the emigre Polish Government will really call for struggle against the Germans, instead of engaging in machinations. We shall maintain good relations with any Government that calls for active struggle against the Germans. But I am not at all sure that the present emigre Government in London is such as it should be. If it sides with the partisans and if we are given a guarantee that its agents will not have ties with the Germans in Poland, we shall be prepared to start talks with it.
Churchill mentioned three matches. I should like te ask him what it means.
Churchill: It would be a good thing now at the round table to hear the views of the Russians on Poland’s borders. | think Eden or I could then make them known to the Poles.
47
We believe that Poland unquestionably should be satisfied at the expense of Germany. We are prepared to tell the Poles that this is a good plan, and that they cannot expect a better one. After this we could raise the question of restor- ing relations. But 1 should like to emphasise that we want a strong independent Poland, friendly to Russia.
Stalin: The question is that the Ukrainian lands should go to the Ukraine, and the Byelorussian, to Byelorussia, 1.e., the 1939 border established by the Soviet Constitution should exist between us and Poland. The Soviet Government stands for this border and considers that this is correct.
What other questions are there for discussion?
Roosevelt: The question of Germany.
Stalin: What are the proposals on this matter?
Roosevelt: The partition of Germany.
Churchill: | am for partitioning Germany. But | should like to consider the question of partitioning Prussia. I am for separating Bavaria and the other provinces from Germany.
Roosevelt: In order to stimulate our discussion on this question, I want to set forth a plan for partitioning Ger- many into five states, which I personally drew up two months ago.
Churchill: | should like to stress that the root of evil in Germany is Prussia.
Roosevelt: 1 should like us to have a picture of the whole before we speak of the separate components. In my opinion, Prussia must be weakened as far as possible, and reduced in size. Prussia should constitute the first independent part of Germany. The second part of Germany should include Hannover and the north-western regions of Germany. The third part—Saxony and the Leipzig area. The fourth part —Hessen Province, Darmstadt, Kassel and the areas to the south of the Rhine, and also the old towns of Westphalia. The fifth part—Bavaria, Baden, Wurttemberg. Each of these five parts would be an independent state. In addition, the regions of the Kiel Canal and Hamburg should be separat- ed from Germany. These regions would be administered by the United Nations, or the four Powers. The Ruhr and the Saar must be placed either under the control of the United Nations or under the trusteeship of the whole of Europe. That is my proposal. I must add that it is merely exploratory.
48
Churchill: You have said a mouthful. | think there are two questions: one—destructive, the other—constructive. I have two ideas: the first is to isolate Prussia from the rest of Germany; the second is to separate Germany’s southern provinces—Bavaria, Baden, Wurttemberg, the Palatinate, from the Saar to Saxony inclusive. I would keep Prussia in strict conditions. I think it would be easy to sever the south- ern provinces from Prussia and include them in a Danu- bian federation. The people who live in the Danube basin are not the cause of war. At any rate, I would give the Prussians harsher treatment than the other Germans. The southern Germans will not start a new war.
Stalin: I do not like the plan for new associations of states. If it is decided to partition Germany no new asso- ciations need be set up. Whether it is five or six states, and two regions into which Roosevelt proposes to divide Ger- many, this plan of Roosevelt’s to weaken Germany can be examined. Like us, Churchill will soon have to deal with great masses of Germans. Churchill will then see that it is not only the Prussians who are fighting in the German Army but also Germans from the other provinces of Germany. Only the Austrians, when surrendering, shout “I’m Aus- trian”, and our soldiers accept them. As for the Germans from Germany’s other provinces they fight with equal dog- gedness. Regardless of how we approach the partitioning of Germany there is no need to set up some new association of Danubian states lacking vitality. Hungary and Austria must exist separately. Austria existed as a separate state until it was seized.
Roosevelt: | agree with Marshal Stalin, in particular, that there is no difference between Germans from the various German provinces. Fifty years ago there was a difference but now all German soldiers are alike. It is true that this does not apply to the Prussian officers.
Churchill: I should not like to be understood as not favouring the partition of Germany. But I wanted to say that if Germany is broken up into several parts without these parts being combined then, as Marshal Stalin said, the time will come when the Germans will unite.
Stalin: There are no steps that could exclude the possibil- ity of Germany’s unification.
Churchill: Does Marshal Stalin prefer a divided Europe? Stalin: Europe has nothing to do with it. I don’t know
4-876 49
that there is need to set up four, five or six independent German states. This question must be discussed.
Roosevelt: Should a special committee be set up to study the question of Germany, or should it be referred to the London Commission?
Stalin: This question could be referred to the London Commission, in which there are representatives of our three states.
Churchill: I should now like to return to the Polish ques- tion, which appears to me to be more urgent because the Poles can make a great deal of noise. I should like to read out my following proposals on the Polish question. I am not asking you to agree with it in the form in which I have drawn it up, because I have not yet taken a final decision myself.
My proposal says:
“It was agreed in principle that the hearth of the Polish state and people must be situated between the so-called Cur- zon Line and the line of the Oder River, including Eastern Prussia and the Oppeln Province as part of Poland. But the final drawing of the boundary line requires thorough study and possible resettlement in some points.”
Stalin: The Russians have no ice-free ports on the Baltic. That is why the Russians would need the ice-free ports of Konigsberg and Memel and the corresponding part of the territory of Eastern Prussia, particularly since these are age- old Slav lands. If the British agree to the transfer of the said territory to us, we shall agree to the formula proposed by Churchill.
Churchill: This is a very interesting proposal which I will make a point of studying.
COMMUNIQUE ON THE CONFERENCE OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE ALLIED COUNTRIES— THE U.S.S.R., THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN— HELD IN TEHRAN
The Conference of the Heads of Government of the three Allied Powers was held in Tehran from November 28 to December 1. J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Peo- ple’s Commissars of the U.S.S.R., F. D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America and W. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, took part in its work.
The Conference adopted the Declaration on the joint action in the war against Germany and the post-war co- operation of the three Powers and also the Declaration Regarding Iran. The texts are published below.
DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS
We—the President of the United States, the Prime Min- ister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past, in this, the capital of our Ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy.
We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.
As to war—our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached com- plete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south.
The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.
And as to peace—we are sure that our concord will win an enduring peace. We recognise fully the supreme respon-
* 51
sibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the good will of the overwhelm- ing mass of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.
With our diplomatic advisers we have surveyed the prob- lems of the future. We shall seek the co-operation and active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppres- sion and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of democratic nations.
No power on earth can prevent our destroying the Ger- man armies by land, their U-Boats by sea, and their war plants from the air.
Our attack will be relentless and increasing.
Emerging from these cordial conferences we look with confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.
We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.
Signed in Tehran on December 1, 1943 ROOSEVELT, STALIN, CHURCHILL
DECLARATION REGARDING IRAN
The President of the United States of America, the Pre- mier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, de- sire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Gov- ernments regarding their relations with Iran.
The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United King- dom recognise the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particu- larly by facilitating transportation of supplies from over- seas to the Soviet Union.
The three Governments realise that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran and they are agreed
52
that they will continue to make available to the Govern- ment of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials and supplies for civil- ian consumption.
With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problem confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full considera- tion along with those of the other members of the United Nations by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.
The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United King- dom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the partici- pation of Iran together with all other peace-loving nations in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.
December 1, 1943 CHURCHILL, STALIN, ROOSEVELT
THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE (February 4-11, 1945)
First Sitting at Livadia Palace February 4, 1945
Stalin asked Roosevelt to open the sitting.
Roosevelt said that neither law nor history envisaged that he should open conferences. It was pure chance that he had opened the Conference at Tehran. He, Roosevelt, considered it a great honour to open the present Conference. He would like to start by expressing his gratitude for the hospitality accorded him.
The leaders of the three Powers, said Roosevelt, already understood each other well and their mutual understanding was growing. They all wanted an early end of the war and stable peace. That was why the participants in the Confer- ence were able to start their unofficial talks. He, Roosevelt, believed the talks should be frank. Experience showed that frankness in talks made for an early achievement of good decisions. The participants in the Conference would have the maps of Europe, Asia and Africa before them. The day’s sit- ting, however, was to be devoted to the situation on the Eastern front, where the troops of the Red Army had been advancing with such success. He, Roosevelt, asked someone to report on the situation at the Soviet-German front.
Stalin replied that he could offer a report by Army Gen- fe Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red
rmy.
Antonov: “1. On January 12-15, the Soviet forces went over to the offensive on a 700-kilometre front between the Niemen River and the Carpathians.
“General Chernyakhovsky’s troops were advancing on Konigsberg.
“Marshal Rokossovsky’s troops were advancing along the northern bank of the Vistula, cutting off East Prussia from Germany’s central areas.
‘Marshal Zhukov’s troops were advancing south of the Vistula towards Poznan.
“Marshal Konev’s troops were advancing on Czestochowa and Breslau.
“General Petrov’s troops were advancing on Nowy Targ in the area of the Carpathians.
“The main blow was struck by the forces under Rokos- sovsky, Zhukov and Konev on a 300-kilometre front between Ostroleka and Krakow.
“9, Because of the unfavourable weather conditions, the operation had been planned for the end of January, when an improvement in the weather had been expected.
“Since the operation had been regarded and prepared as one with decisive aims, the intention had been to conduct it in more favourable conditions.
“However, in view of the alarming situation that had de- veloped on the Western front, in connection with the German offensive in the Ardennes, the High Command of the So- viet forces ordered the offensive to be started not later than mid-January, without waiting for the weather to improve.
“3. When the Soviet forces reached the Narew and the Vistula, the enemy grouping was most solid in the central sector of the front, because a strike from that sector would take our troops to Germany’s vital centres along the shortest route.
“In order to create the most advantageous conditions for the offensive, the Soviet High Command decided to thin out this central grouping of the enemy.
“With that end in view, it conducted a supporting opera- tion against East Prussia and continued the offensive in Hungary in the direction of Budapest.
“Both these directions were highly sensitive for the Ger- mans, and they quickly reacted to our offensive by moving some forces from the central sector of the front to the flanks; thus, of the 24 tank divisions on our front, which constituted the Germans’ main striking force, 11 tank divisions were moved to the Budapest direction, and 6 tank divisions, to East Prussia (3 tank divisions were in Kurland), thus leav- ing only 4 tank divisions in the central sector of the front.
“The objective set by the High Command has been at- tained.
“4. The balance of forces in the direction of the main attack:
55
“On the front between Ostroleka and Krakéw, that is, the direction of our main attack, the enemy had up to 80 divi- sions; we created a grouping with a view to obtaining the following superiority over the enemy:
“Infantry—more than double (up to 180 divisions).
“Artillery, tanks and aviation—overwhelming.
“In the break-through sectors, the artillery density creat- ed was 220-230 pieces (from 76 mm and greater) per kilo- metre of front.
“5, The offensive was started in highly unfavourable weath- er conditions (low clouds and fog), which absolutely ruled out air force operations and limited artillery observation to a hundred metres.
“Thanks to the good preliminary reconnaissance and pow- erful artillery offensive, the enemy’s fire system was sup- pressed and his fortifications destroyed. This enabled our troops to advance 10-15 kilometres on the first day of the offensive, that is, to break through the whole tactical depth of the enemy’s defences.
“6. Results of the offensive:
“(a) By February 1, that is, in 18 days of the offensive, the Soviet forces had advanced up to 500 kilometres in the are of the main attack, averaging 25-30 kilometres a
ay.
“(b) The Soviet forces have reached the Oder in the sec- tor from Kistrin (north of Frankfort) and to the south, and occupied the Silesian industrial area.
“(c) The main routes linking the enemy’s East Prussian grouping with the central areas of Germany have been cut.
“Thus, in addition to the Kurland grouping (26 divisions), the enemy’s grouping in East Prussia has been isolated (up to 27 divisions); a number of isolated groupings of Germans (in the area of Lédz, Thorn, Poznan, Schneidemihl, etc., a total of up to 15 divisions) have been encircled and are being destroyed.
“(d) Permanent-type defence positions of the Germans in East Prussia—in the Konigsberg and Letzen directions—have been broken through.
“(e) Forty-five German divisions have been routed, with the enemy suffering the following losses:
about 100,000 prisoners about 300,000 dead a total of up to 400,000 men
56
“7. The enemy’s probable operations:
“(a) The Germans will defend Berlin, for which purpose they will try to hold back the advance of the Soviet forces on the Oder line, organising defence there with the help of retreating troops and reserves transferred from Germany, Western Europe and Italy.
“The enemy will try to use his Kurland grouping for the de- fence of Pomerania, transporting it by sea beyond the Vistula.
“(b) The Germans will cover the Vienna direction as solidly as possible, reinforcing it up with troops operating in Italy.
“8. Movement of enemy troops:
“(a) The following have already made their appearance on our front:
9 divisions from the central areas of Germany
6 divisions from the West European front
i division from Italy
16 divisions
“(b) On the way:
4 tank divisions
1 motorised division
5 divisions
“(c) Up to 30-35 divisions more will probably be moved (from the West European front, Norway and Italy, and reserves in Germany).
“Thus, an additional 35-40 divisions may appear on our front.
“9. Our wishes:
“(a) Speed up the offensive by the Allied forces on the Western front, for which the situation now is very favour- able, namely:
(1) Defeat of the Germans on the Eastern front;
“(2) Defeat of the German grouping which had attacked in the Ardennes;
(3) Weakening of the German forces in the West in view of the transfer of their reserves to the East.
“It is desirable that an offensive should be started in the first half of February.
“(b) Prevent the enemy from transferring his forces to the East from the Western front, Norway and Italy, by air strikes against his communications; in particular, paralyse the Berlin and Leipzig junctions.
57
“(c) Prevent the enemy from withdrawing his forces from Italy.”
(The written text of Antonov’s report was handed to Roosevelt and Churchill.)
Stalin asked whether there were any questions.
Roosevelt said he would like to know what the Soviet Government intended to do with the German locomotives, rolling stock and railways. He asked whether the Soviet Government intended to widen the gauge of the German railways.
Antonov replied that since the locomotives and the roll- ing stock abandoned by the Germans were of little use, the gauge of the German railways would have to be altered in several key directions.
Roosevelt stated that, in his opinion, it would be well for the Allied staffs to jointly discuss this question as the Allied forces were rapidly approaching each other.
Antonov said the Soviet command was altering the gauge on a minimum number of directions needed to ensure the supply of the Soviet forces.
Stalin said the bulk of the railways remained unaltered. The Soviet command had been changing the gauge of the railways none too eagerly.
Churchill declared that he had several questions to ask. He believed there were a number of questions which it would be expedient for the three staffs to discuss. For example, the question of time. It should be determined how much time the Germans would need to transfer eight divisions from Italy to the Soviet front. What should be done to pre- vent such a transfer? Should not a part of the Allied forces be transferred through the Ljubljana corridor to join up with the Red Army? It would also be necessary to deter- mine the time that would take, and whether it might not be too late to do it.
He, Churchill, had indicated only one of the questions which could be discussed by the staffs. He proposed that General Marshall should make a report on the operations at the Western front whose conduct would be of assistance to the Soviet armies.
Roosevelt agreed with the Prime Minister. He said the Allies had been fighting at a great distance from each other. Germany had shrunk, and that was why closer contact be-
58
tween the staffs of the three countries was of special im- portance.
Stalin said that was right.
General Marshall declared that the consequences of the German offensive in the Ardennes had been eliminated. In the previous few weeks, General Eisenhower had regrouped his divisions. At the same time, General Eisenhower had continued to exercise pressure on the enemy in the area of the German counter-offensive. As a result of the operations he had conducted, General Eisenhower had discovered that the Germans had rather big forces in the Ardennes. That was why General Eisenhower had begun to concentrate his forces in the north.
In the southern sector of the front, i.e., to the north of Switzerland, the objective of the planned operation was to throw back the Germans into the area of Muhthausen and Colmar. The objective of the operations being conducted to the north of Strasbourg was to liquidate the bridgehead on the left bank of the Rhine. At the time, the 25th Army group and the U.S. 9th Army, which were under the command of Montgomery, were preparing for an offensive in the north- ern sector. The U.S. 9th Army would attack in the north- eastern direction.
The Allied command hoped to start the first of these oper- ations on February 8. The second operation was to start in a week or possibly somewhat earlier. The Allies expected the Germans to retreat to Dusseldorf, after which the Allied troops would move on to Berlin. As many forces were to be moved into this offensive as allowed by the supply facilities. Paratroops would be used. The crossing of the Rhine in the north was expected to be possible in early March. In the north, there were three suitable places for forcing the Rhine.
For a certain time, the operations on the Western front had developed slowly because of the lack of tonnage. Then, following the opening of Antwerp, things were livening up, and the Allies were able to bring in from 70,000 to 80,000 tons of dry cargo a day, and 12,000 tons of liquid fuel. The Germans were trying to hamper the Allied supply and con- tinued to bombard Antwerp with flying bombs. Information received that day showed that 60 flying bombs and 6 rockets had fallen in the Antwerp area in the previous 24 hours.
Stalin said bombs and rockets rarely hit the target.
59
Marshall remarked that there was always the possibility of bombs hitting vessels in the port.
He stated that the Allied air force had always been active when the weather permitted. Great destruction had been inflicted by fighters and light and heavy bombers. Infor- mation received that day indicated that troop trains on their way to the Soviet-German front had been attacked from the air. Great destruction had been done on the railways north of Strasbourg. Heavy bombers had attacked mainly plants producing fuel to deprive Germany of the possibility of supplying her tanks with fuel. Fuel production in Ger- many had fallen by 60 per cent. The air force had also been raiding communication lines. Tank works had been heavily raided.
As for the situation in Italy and to the south of Switzer- land, he, Marshall, had the following to report. To the south of Switzerland, Germany had one or two divisions, and in Italy, 27 divisions. In Italy, the Allies had a force equal to that of the Germans. In addition, the Allies had an air force in Italy which was destroying the Germans’ rolling stock, railways and bridges.
The Germans, Marshall declared, would probably soon resume their submarine offensive because they had produced an improved submarine. The Germans had at the time about 30 submarines at their disposal. Despite the small number of submarines, they could present a serious threat to Allied shipping because the devices developed by the Allies were unable to detect submarines of the improved type. That was why the operations of heavy bombers were directed against the shipyards where submarines were being built. The bomb- er operations had not detracted from the air force strikes oe Germany’s industry, in particular, plants making uel.
Churchill said he would like to hear Field-Marshal Brooke and Admiral Cunningham. The speed of the Soviet advance was at the time highly important, because Danzig was one of the places where many submarines were concentrated.
Stalin asked where else submarines were concentrated.
Churchill replied that it was at Kiel and Hamburg.
Brooke stated that, in his opinion, the Allied plans and operations on the Western front had been given a full ex- position.
Churchill said that before the participants in the Con-
60
ns
ference passed on to other, non-military, questions, he would like to mention one matter relating to the forcing of rivers. The Allies had a special centre for the study of forced river crossings. The officer in command of that centre was then in Yalta. Churchill said they would be grateful if the officer could contact the Soviet military for the purpose of obtain- ing information on the forcing of rivers. The Russians were known to have great experience, especially in the forcing of ice-bound rivers.
Stalin said he had a number of questions to ask. He would like to know the length of the front on which the break- through was to be made.
Marshall replied that the break-through was to be made on a front between 50 and 60 miles long.
Stalin asked whether the Germans had any fortifications on the front where the break-through was being planned.
Marshall replied that the Germans had built heavy-type fortifications in that sector of the front.
Stalin asked whether the Allies would have the reserves to exploit the success.
Marshall replied in the affirmative.
Stalin said he had asked the question because the Soviet command was aware of the great importance of reserves. That had become especially clear during the winter cam- paign. He would like to ask how many tank divisions the Allies had concentrated in the sector of the planned break- through. During the winter break-through, the Soviet com- mand had concentrated about 9,000 tanks in the central sector of the front.
Marshall replied that he did not know that, but there would be one tank division for three infantry divisions, i.e., about 10-12 tank divisions for 35 divisions.
Stalin asked how many tanks there were in an Allied divi- sion.
Marshall replied: 300 tanks.
Churchill noted that on the entire West European theatre the Allies had 10,000 tanks.
Stalin said that was a great deal. On the front of the main attack the Soviet command had concentrated between 8,000 and 9,000 planes. He asked how many planes the Allies had.
Portal replied that the Allies had nearly as many planes, including 4,000 bombers, each of which was capable of car- rying a bomb-load of from 3 to 5 tons.
61
Stalin asked what superiority the Allies had in infantry. On the front of the main attack the Soviet command had a superiority in infantry of 100 divisions to the Germans’ 80.
Churchill declared that the Allies had never had any great superiority in infantry, but the Allies had at times had very great superiority in the air.
Stalin said the Soviet command had great superiority in artillery. He asked whether the Allies were interested to learn how Soviet artillery operated. Stalin said that the Soviet people, being the Allies’ comrades-in-arms, could exchange experience with them. A year before, the Soviet command had established a special break-through artillery force. It had produced good results. An artillery division had from 300 to 400 guns. For example, on a front of 35-40 kilometres Marshal Konev had had six artillery break- through divisions supplemented with corps artillery. As a result, there had been almost 230 guns per kilometre of the break-through. After an artillery barrage, many Germans had been killed, others had been stunned and could not come to for a long time. That had opened the gates for the Red Army. From then on the advance had not been difficult.
He, Stalin, was sorry to have taken up time in relating the above. Stalin said he had expressed the wishes in respect of how the Allied armies could help the Soviet forces. He would like to know what wishes the Allies had in respect of the Soviet forces.
Churchill stated that he would like to take the opportunity to express his profound admiration for the might the Red Army had demonstrated in its offensive.
Stalin said that was not a wish.
Churchill declared that the Allies were aware of the dif- ficulty of their task and did not minimise it. But the Allies were confident they would cope with their task. All the Al- lied commanders were confident of that. Although the attack was to be made against the Germans’ strongest point, the Allies were sure that it would be a success and would be of benefit to the operations of the Soviet forces. As for any wishes, the Allies wanted the offensive of the Soviet armies to continue just as successfully.
auc declared that he was in agreement with Chur- chill.
Stalin said the Red Army’s offensive, for which Churchill had expressed his gratitude, was in fulfilment of a comrade-
62
z.
ly duty. According to the decisions adopted at the Tehran Conference, the Soviet Government had been under no obli- gation to launch a winter offensive.
The President had asked him whether he, Stalin, could receive a representative of General Eisenhower. He, Stalin, had naturally given his consent. Churchill had sent him a message, asking him whether he, Stalin, was planning to start an offensive in January. He, Stalin, had realised that neither Churchill nor Roosevelt were asking him outright for an offensive; he had appreciated this tact on the part of the Allies, but he had seen that such an offensive had been necessary for the Allies. The Soviet command had started its offensive even before the planned date. The Soviet Gov- ernment had considered that to be its duty, the duty of an ally, although it was under no formal obligation on this score. He, Stalin, would like the leaders of the Allied Pow- ers to take into account that Soviet leaders did not merely fulfil their obligations but were also prepared to fulfil their moral duty as far as possible.
As for the wishes, he asked about them because Tedder had expressed the wish that the Soviet forces should not stop their offensive until the end of March. He, Stalin, un- derstood this to be possibly the wish not only of Tedder, but also of other Allied military leaders. Stalin said that the Soviet forces would continue their offensive, if the weather permitted and the roads were passable.
Roosevelt stated that he was in complete agreement with the opinion of Marshal Stalin. At the conference in Tehran it had been impossible to draw up a common plan of opera- tions. He, Roosevelt, took it that each Ally was morally bound to advance with the utmost possible speed. At the time of the Tehran Conference there had been a great dis- tance between the Allied forces moving from the East and the West. But the time had come when it was necessary to ee more thoroughly the operations of the Allied
orces.
Churchill declared that he welcomed the words of Mar- shal Stalin. He, Churchill, believed he could say the fol- lowing on behalf of the President and himself. The reason why the Allies had not concluded at Tehran any agreement with the Soviet Union on future operations, was their con- fidence in the Soviet people and its military.
63
Roosevelt replied that the Tehran Conference had been held before his re-election. It had been still unknown wheth- er or not the American people would be on his side. That was why it had been hard to draw up any common military lan.
P Churchill said the question raised by Tedder in his talk with Marshal Stalin could subsequently be discussed by the Allied staffs. Churchill said that the three leaders could, of course, be criticised for failing to co-ordinate the Allied offensives. If the weather hampered the operations of the Soviet forces, perhaps the Allies would then attack on their front. But that question must be decided by the staffs.
Stalin said there was lack of co-ordination. The Soviet forces had stopped their offensive in the autumn. Just then the Allies started their offensive. At the time, it was the other way round. In future, that should be avoided. Stalin asked whether it was expedient for the Allied military to discuss plans for summer operations.
Churchill said that might possibly have to be done. The Allied military could deal with the military questions while the leaders dealt with the political ones.
Stalin replied that that was right.
Cunningham said that he would like to supplement Gen- eral Marshall’s report. The threat of a fresh outbreak of submarine warfare on the part of the Germans was potential rather than actual. The Germans had achieved great success in improving their submarines. But that was not so impor- tant. What was important was that the Germans were already building new-type submarines. The submarines would be fit- ted out with the latest technical devices, and would have a great speed under water. The naval forces would, there- fore, find it very hard to fight them. The German submarines were being built at Bremen, Hamburg and Danzig. If he, Cunningham, could express one wish, it was that, as a repre- sentative of the naval department, he would like to ask the Soviet forces to take Danzig as soon as possible, because 30 per cent of submarine construction was concentrated there.
Roosevelt asked whether Danzig was within the range of Soviet artillery.
Stalin replied that Danzig was not yet within the range of Soviet artillery. The Soviet command hoped soon to ap- proach Danzig to within the range of artillery fire. Churchill said the military could meet the next morning.
64
Stalin said he was in agreement with that. He proposed that the meeting be set for 12 o’clock.
Churchill declared that at the meeting the military should discuss not only the situation on the Eastern and Western fronts, but also on the Italian front, and also the question how best to use the available forces. He, Churchill, also pro- posed that a meeting be fixed for the next day to discuss political questions, namely, the future of Germany, if she had any.
Stalin replied that Germany would have a future.
Second Sitting at Livadia Palace February 5, 1945
Roosevelt stated that the sitting would be devoted to po- litical affairs. Questions pertaining to Germany ought to be selected. The questions of a world character—such as those of Dakar and Indochina—could be postponed. One of the questions that had already come up before the Allied Gov- ernments was that of occupation zones. It was a matter not of permanent but of temporary occupation. The question was becoming more and more urgent.
Stalin said that he would like the sitting to discuss the following questions. First, the proposals to dismember Ger- many.! There had been an exchange of opinion on the point at Tehran, and then between him, Stalin, and Churchill, in Moscow in October 1944. No decisions had been adopted either in Tehran or Moscow. Some opinion should be arrived at on the question at the Conference.
There was also another question relating to Germany: should Germany be allowed any central government, or should the Allies confine themselves to the establishment of an administration in Germany or, if it was decided, after all, to dismember Germany, should several governments be established there, depending on the number of parts into which Germany would be split up? These points had to be cleared up.
! Proposals on the dismemberment of Germany were first submitted at meetings of the heads of the Three Powers by the United States and Britain at the Tehran Conference.—Ed.
5-876
65
The third question related to unconditional surrender. They all stood on the basis of the unconditional surrender of Germany. But he, Stalin, would like to know whether or not the Allies would leave the Hitler Government in power if it surrendered unconditionally. The one excluded the other. But if that was so, as much should be said. The Allies had the experience of the surrender of Italy, but there they had had the concrete demands which constituted the content of the unconditional surrender. Weren't the three Allies going to determine the concrete content of the uncondition- al surrender of Germany? That question too should be cleared up.
Finally, there was the question of reparations, Germany’s compensation for losses, and the question of the amount of the indemnity. .
He, Stalin, raised all those questions in addition to the questions put forward by the President.
Roosevelt declared that, as he saw it, the questions raised by Marshal Stalin referred to a permanent state of affairs. However, they flowed from the question of occupation zones in Germany. The zones might prove to be the first step in the dismemberment of Germany.
Stalin declared that if the Allies intended to dismember Germany they should say so. There had been two exchanges of opinion between the Allies on the dismemberment of Germany after her military defeat. The first time at Tehran, when the President had proposed that Germany should be divided into five parts. At Tehran the Prime Minister too had stood for a dismemberment of Germany, although he had hesitated. But that had been only an exchange of opinion.
The second time the question of Germany’s dismember- ment had been discussed between him, Stalin, and the Prime Minister in Moscow the previous October. Under discussion had been the British plan for the division of Germany into two states: Prussia with her provinces and Bavaria, with the Ruhr and Westphalia being placed under international control. But no decision had been taken in Moscow, nor had it been possible to take one, because the President had not been present in Moscow.
Churchill declared that he agreed in principle to the dis- memberment of Germany, but the method of demarcating the frontiers of the separate parts of Germany was too compli-
66
cated for the question to be settled there in a matter of five or six days. It would take a very thorough study of the historical, ethnic and economic factors, and weeks of dis- cussions of the question in a subcommittee or committee which would be set up for a detailed elaboration of the proposals and submission of recommendations in respect of the mode of action. The talks the heads of the three Gov- ernments had had on the question at Tehran, and the subse- quent unofficial talks he, Churchill, had had with Marshal Stalin in Moscow, had been a most general approach to the question, without any precise plan.
He, Churchill, would be unable to give an immediate an- swer to the question as to how to divide Germany. He could merely hint at what he thought would be the most expedient way of doing it. But he, Churchill, would have to reserve the right to modify his opinion when he received the recom- mendations of commissions studying the matter. He, Chur- chill, had in mind the strength of Prussia, the tap-root of all evil. It was quite understandable that if Prussia were separated from Germany, her capability for starting a new war would be greatly restricted. He personally believed that the establishment of another big German state in the south, with a capital at Vienna, would provide a dividing line between Prussia and the rest of Germany. The popula- tion of Germany would be equally divided between those two states.
There were other questions which had to be examined. First of all, they agreed that Germany should lose a part of the territory most of which had already been captured by the Russian forces, and which should be given to the Poles. There were also questions relating to the Rhine val- ley, the frontier between France and Germany, and the question of possession of the industrial areas of the Ruhr and the Saar, which had a war potential (in the sense of a possible manufacture of weapons there). Were the areas to be handed over to countries, such as France, or were they to be left under a German administration, or was control over them to be set up by a world organisation in the form of a condominium over a long but specified period? All that required examination. He, Churchill, had to say he was unable to express any definite ideas on the question on behalf of his Government. The British Government must co-ordi- nate its plans with those of the Allies.
= 67
Finally, there was the question of whether Prussia was to be subjected to an internal fragmentation after she was isolated from the rest of Germany. Talks on the matter had been held at Tehran. It appeared that one question could be decided very swiftly, namely, the establishment of an apparatus to examine all the questions. Such an apparatus would have to submit reports to the Governments before the Governments took any final decisions.
He, Churchill, would like to say that the Allies were rath- er well prepared to accept an immediate surrender of Ger- many. All the details of such a surrender had been worked out and were known to the three Governments. There remained the question of reaching official agreement on the zones of occupation and on the control machinery in Ger- many. Assuming that Germany would surrender within a month, or six weeks, or six months, the Allies would only have to occupy Germany by zones.
Stalin said that was not clear. Some group, like Badoglio in Italy, might say it had overthrown the Government. Would the Allies be prepared to deal with such a govern- ment?
Eden said the group would be presented with the terms of surrender which had been agreed upon by the European Advisory Commission.
Churchill stated that he would like to project the possible course of events. Germany was no longer able to wage the war. He proposed to assume that Hitler or Himmler made a proposal of surrender. It was clear that the Allies would tell them that they would not negotiate with them because they were war criminals. If they were the only men in Ger- many, the Allies would continue the war. It was more prob- able that Hitler would try to hide or would be killed as a result of a coup in Germany, and another government would be set up there which would propose surrender. In that case, the Allies must immediately consult with each other on whether or not they could talk with those men in Germany. If they decided that they could, those men should be told the terms of surrender. Should the Allies decide that that group of men was unfit to negotiate with, they would con- tinue the war and occupy the whole country. If those new men made their appearance and signed an unconditional surrender on the terms dictated to them, there would be no need to tell them of their future. Unconditional surrender
68
would give the Allies the opportunity to present addi- tional demands to the Germans on the dismemberment of Germany.
Stalin declared that the demand for dismemberment was not an additional, but a highly essential one.
Churchill said it was, of course, an important demand. But he, Churchill, did not believe it must be presented to the Germans at the first stage. The Allies should come to a precise agreement on this point.
Stalin said that that was why he had raised the question.
Churchill said that although the Allies could study the question of dismemberment, he did not think it would be possible to reach a precise agreement on it just then. The matter required study. In his, Churchill’s, opinion, that kind of question was more suitable for examination at a peace conference.
Roosevelt declared that it seemed to him Marshal Stalin had not received an answer to his question of whether or not they were going to dismember Germany. He, Roose- velt, believed that the question should be decided in prin- ciple, and the details could be left for the future.
Stalin remarked that that was right.
Roosevelt continued that the Prime Minister had said that at the time it was impossible to determine the frontiers of the separate parts of Germany and that the whole question required study. That was right. But the most important thing was still to decide at the Conference the main question whether or not the Allies agreed to dismember Germany. Roosevelt believed it would be well to present the Germans with the terms of surrender and, in addition, to tell them that Germany was to be dismembered. At Tehran, Roosevelt had spoken in favour of a decentralised administration in Ger- many. During his stay in Germany 40 years before, decen- tralised administration had still been a fact: Bavaria or Hes- sen had had a Bavarian or Hessen Government. They had been real Governments. The word “Reich” had not yet existed. But over the previous 20 years, the decentralised administration had been gradually abolished. The whole of the administration had been concentrated at Berlin. It was utopian to talk of plans for a decentralised Germany. That was why, under the conditions, Roosevelt saw no other way out except dismemberment. How many parts were there to be? Six, seven or less? He would not venture to say anything
69
definite on the score. The question had to be studied. But there, in the Crimea, agreement should be reached on whether the Allies were going to tell the Germans that Ger- many was to be dismembered.
Churchill stated that, in his opinion, there was no need to inform the Germans of the future policy to be conducted in respect of their country. The Germans should be told they would have to await further Allied demands after they sur- rendered. These further demands would be made on the Germans by mutual agreement between the Allies. As for dismemberment, he, Churchill, believed that such a deci- sion could not be adopted in a matter of a few days. The Allies were dealing with an 80-million people and it would certainly take more than 30 minutes to settle the question of their future. A commission might take a month to work out the question in detail.
Roosevelt said that the Premier introduced the time factor into the question. If the question of dismemberment were to be publicly debated, there would be hundreds of plans. That was why he, Roosevelt, proposed that within the next 24 hours the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs should draw up a plan of procedure to study the dismemberment of Ger- many and then a detailed plan for the dismemberment of Germany could be drawn up within 30 days.
Churchill declared that the British Government was pre- pared to accept the principle of Germany’s dismemberment and to set up a commission to study the procedure of dis- memberment.
Stalin said he had raised the question to clarify what the Allies wanted. Events would develop towards Germany’s disaster. Germany was losing the war, and her defeat would be hastened as a result of an early Allied offensive. In addi- tion to a military catastrophe, Germany might suffer an internal catastrophe, because she would have neither coal nor grain. Germany had already lost the Dabrowa coal basin, and the Ruhr would soon be under Allied gun fire. With events developing as rapidly as that, he, Stalin, would not like the Allies to be caught unawares. He had raised the question so that the Allies should be prepared for the events. He fully understood Churchill’s considerations that it was hard to draw up a plan for the dismemberment of Germany at the time. That was correct. Nor did he propose that a concrete plan should be drawn up immediately. But the mat-
70
ter should be settled in principle and recorded in the terms of the unconditional surrender.
Churchill declared that an unconditional surrender precluded any armistice agreement. Unconditional surrender was the terms on which military operations were to be ter- minated. Those who signed the terms of an unconditional surrender submitted to the will of the victors.
Stalin said that terms of surrender were nonetheless signed.
Churchill replied in the affirmative and called attention to Article 12 of the terms of Germany’s unconditional sur- render worked out by the European Advisory Commission.
Roosevelt noted that the article said nothing at all about Germany’s dismemberment.
Stalin said that that was right.
Churchill asked whether the terms of the armistice were to be published.
Stalin replied that the terms would not be made public for the time being, they existed for the Allies and would be presented to the German Government when the time came. The Allies would decide when they were to be made public. The Allies were doing the same thing with Italy, whose terms of surrender would be made public when they deemed it necessary.
Roosevelt asked whether the Germans would be given a government or an administration by the Allies. If Germany was dismembered, each of her parts would have an adminis- tration subordinate to the corresponding Allied command.
Churchill said that he did not know that. He, Churchill, found it hard to go beyond the statement made that the British Government was prepared to accept the principle of Germany’s dismemberment and the establishment of a com- mission to work out a plan of dismemberment.
Roosevelt asked whether Churchill was prepared to sup- plement Article 12 with words about the dismemberment of Germany.
Churchill replied that he was prepared to have the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs examine Article 12 for the pur- pose of determining the possibility of including the words “dismemberment of Germany” or some other formulation in the Article.
{A decision was taken to instruct the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to examine the question.)
Churchill said the question of a government in Germany could be discussed.
Stalin stated that he preferred to discuss the question of reparations.
Roosevelt agreed and said there were two sides to the reparations question. First, the small countries, like Den- mark, Norway and Holland, would also want to receive reparations from Germany. Secondly, the question arose of making use of German manpower. He, Roosevelt, wanted to ask what quantity of German manpower the Soviet Union would like to have. As for the United States of America, it needed neither German machinery nor German manpower.
Stalin replied that the Soviet Government had a plan for material reparations. As for the use of German manpower, the Soviet Government was not yet prepared to discuss that question.
Churchill asked whether he could have some information about the Soviet reparations plan.
Stalin said he would let Maisky speak on the question.
Maisky stated that the material reparations plan was based on several key principles.
The first principle was that the reparations were to be received from Germany not in money, as had been the case after the previous world war, but in kind.
The second principle was that Germany was to make its payments in kind in two forms, namely, (a) lump with- drawals from Germany’s national wealth, both on the terri- tory of Germany proper and outside, at the end of the war (factories, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, investments in foreign enterprises, etc.), and (b) annual goods deliveries after the end of the war.
The third principle was in short that by way of repara- tions payments Germany was to be economically disarmed, as otherwise security in Europe could not be ensured. Con- cretely this meant the removal of 80 per cent of the equip- ment from Germany’s heavy industry (steel, engineering, metalworking, electrical engineering, chemistry, etc.). Air- craft factories and plants producing synthetic fuel were to be removed 100 per cent. All specialised military enterprises (arms factories, munitions plants, etc.) which had existed before the war or had been built during the war, were equally to be removed 100 per cent. The Soviet Government believed that the 20 per cent of Germany’s pre-war heavy
72
industry which was to remain, would be quite sufficient to cover the country’s actual economic requirements.
The fourth principle was that the reparations period was set at 10 years, with removals from national wealth to be made within two years after the end of the war.
The fifth principle was that for the purpose of precise fulfilment by Germany of her reparations obligations, and also in the interests of security in Europe, strict Anglo-Soviet- American control must be established over the German economy. The forms of control were to be worked out later. But in any case, provision was to be made that the indus- trial, transport and other enterprises remaining in Germany which constituted the greatest danger from the standpoint of a possible revival of Germany’s war potential were to be internationalised, with the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Great Britain participating in their administration. Control over the German economy was to be maintained after the expiry of the period of the reparations payments, i.e., after the first 10 years following the end of the war.
The sixth principle was that in view of the unprecedented immensity of the damage caused by the German aggression, it would be impossible to make it good fully even with the strictest exaction of reparations from Germany. The Soviet Government had tried to make a rough estimate of the scale of the damage—the figures obtained were quite astronomical. That was why the Soviet Government had arrived at the conclusion that if the Allies were to be realis- tic, only that type of damage should be subject to indem- nification which could be characterised as direct material loss (destruction of or damage to houses, plants, railways, research institutions; confiscation of cattle, grain, private property of citizens, etc.). But since Soviet preliminary esti- mates, under the head of direct material losses alone, had yielded a total amount of damage in excess of the amount of possible reparations by way of direct removal and annual post-war deliveries, it would apparently be necessary to establish a certain priority in the receipt of compensation by countries which had the right to it. That priority was to be based on two indicators: (a) the size of the country’s con- tribution to the victory over the enemy, and (b) the amount of direct material losses suffered by that country. Countries having the highest indicators under both heads were to receive reparations first, and the rest, later.
73
The seventh principle was that the U.S.S.R. considered it fair to receive at least $10,000 million in compensation for its direct material losses, through removals and annual deliv- eries. That was, of course, only a very insignificant por- tion of the total amount of direct material losses suffered by the Soviet Union, but in the circumstances the Soviet Gov- ernment was ready to be satisfied with that figure.
Finally, the eighth principle was that a special Repara- tions Commission, consisting of representatives of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Great Britain should be set up, with headquarters in Moscow, to work out a detailed Allied reparations plan on the basis of the principles set forth above.
Such, in brief outline, was the material reparations plan which the Soviet Government placed before the Conference for discussion and approval.
Churchill said he well remembered the end of the pre- vious war. Although he, Churchill, had not directly partici- pated in framing the peace terms, he had access to all the conferences. The reparations had proved to be highly dis- appointing. Only £1,000 million had been with great effort got out of Germany. But even that amount would not have been obtained but for U.S. and British investments in Ger- many. Britain had taken from Germany a few old ocean liners, and with the money Germany got from Britain, she built herself a new fleet. He, Churchill, hoped that Britain would not face similar difficulties again.
Churchill had no doubt at all that Russia’s sacrifices were greater than those of any other country. He had always believed that the removal of plants from Germany would be a correct step. But he was also quite sure it would be impossible to receive from a defeated and destroyed Ger- many the quantity of values which would compensate for the losses sustained by Russia alone. He doubted that £250 million a year could be extracted from Germany. At the end of the previous war, the British had also dreamed of astronomical figures—but what had been the result?
Great Britain had suffered very heavily in the current war. A great part of her houses had been destroyed or dam- aged. Britain had sold all her investments abroad. Britain had to export goods to import foodstuffs; she had to buy abroad half of the food she needed. Fighting for the com- mon cause, Britain had run into heavy debt, apart from
74
Lend-Lease. Britain’s total debt was £3,000 million. No other country among the victors would find herself in such a dif- ficult economic and financial position at the end of the war as Great Britain. If he, Churchill, saw the possibility of maintaining the British economy through the exaction of reparations from Germany, he would resolutely take that way. But he was doubtful of success.
Other countries had also suffered great destruction. Hol- land was flooded. Norway had suffered heavily. True, their population was not big.
Moreover, what was going to happen to Germany? Chur- chill saw the spectre of a starving Germany with her 80 million population. Who was going to feed her? Who was going to pay for that? Wouldn’t the Allies eventually have to cover a part of the reparations from their own pocket?
Stalin remarked that all those questions would certainly come up sooner or later.
Churchill said if one wanted to ride a horse one had to feed it with oats and hay.
Stalin replied that the horse should not charge at one.
Churchill admitted his metaphor was not very happy, and said that if one put a car in place of the horse one would still have to fill it up with petrol to use it.
Stalin replied that there was no analogy there. The Ger- mans were men and not machines.
Churchill agreed with that too. Returning to the repara- tions, Churchill spoke in favour of setting up a Reparations Commission which would deliberate in secret.
Roosevelt declared that he, too, well remembered the previous war, and recalled that the United States had lost a great deal of money. It had loaned Germany more than $10,000 million, but it would not repeat its old mistakes. The United States had no intention of using German man- power. The United States did not want any German machine tools. At the end of the previous war, there had been many German assets and German property in the United States. All that had been returned to the Germans.
He, Roosevelt, believed that things would be different after the current war. A special law might have to be issued under which all German property in the United States would remain in American hands. Roosevelt agreed with Chur- chill that some thought should be given to Germany’s future. But despite the generosity of the United States, which was
75
helping other countries, the United States was unable to guarantee the future of Germany. The United States did not want German living standards to be higher than those in the U.S.S.R. The United States wanted to help the Soviet Union to obtain everything necessary from Germany. The Americans wanted to help the British to increase their exports and find new market outlets to replace Germany.
Roosevelt believed that the time was ripe to set up a Reparations Commission to study the needs of the U.S.S.R. and the other European countries. He agreed to have the Commission work in Moscow. Roosevelt very much hoped that everything destroyed in the Soviet Union could be made good. But he was also sure that it would be impossible to cover everything by reparations. Germany should be left with enough industry to keep the Germans from dying of starvation.
Churchill declared that he had no objections to the Repa- rations Commission being in Moscow.
Maisky said that he would like to reply briefly to Chur- chill and Roosevelt. In his remarks he intended to deal with three main points.
First, the question on which Churchill had dwelt specif- ically—the failure of reparations after the previous war. Indeed, that experience had proved to be extremely unsatis- factory. But why? The reason had not been that the total amount of reparations levied on Germany had been exces- sive. Actually, the amount had been very modest: $30,000 million spread over a period of 58 years. Was that a great deal? According to the state of her national wealth and national income, Germany could have very easily paid such a sum. The trouble had been, however, that the Allies had wanted Germany to pay reparations chiefly in money, and not in kind. Germany had had to find ways of obtain- ing the necessary amount of foreign exchange. That, for various reasons, had turned out to be a very difficult task. There would have been no complications at all if the Allies had been prepared to receive reparations in kind. But the Allies had not wanted that. As a result there had arisen an insoluble transfer problem, i.e., the conversion of German marks into pounds, dollars and francs, and that problem had killed the reparations after the previous war.
There was another factor which had greatly contributed to the failure of reparations after 1914-1918; it had been the
76
policy of the United States, Britain and France. They had invested large amounts of capital in Germany, thereby encouraging the Germans not to fulfil their reparations obli- gations. Eventually, Germany has repaid, in the form of reparations, only about one-fourth of the amount the British, Americans and French had loaned Germany in the first years after the 1914-1918 war.
That was the root cause of the failure of the previous reparations. To avoid the difficulties of transfer, it was proposed that all reparations should be paid in kind. It was also hoped that the United States and Britain would not again finance Germany after the end of the war. (Roosevelt and Churchill indicated by gestures and exclamations that they intended to do nothing of the sort.) In the circumstances, there was no reason to draw pessimistic conclusions for the new reparations from the unfortunate experience of the old.
Secondly, Churchill had indicated that the reparations figure claimed by the U.S.S.R. would be excessive for Ger- many. That was hardly fair. In effect, what did the figure of $10,000 million represent? It constituted only 10 per cent of the Federal budget of the United States for 1944/45. (Stettinius: “Absolutely correct”.) It was also equal to one and a quarter of the U.S. Federal peacetime budget (for example, in the period between 1936 and 1938). As to Brit- ain, the same figure of $10,000 million was equal to no more than Great Britain’s war spending over a period of six months, or two and a half times her national peacetime budget (1936-1938).
In that case, was it right to say that the Soviet Union’s claims were excessive? It was not. Rather, they were much too modest. But that modesty sprang from the Soviet Gov- ernment’s desire to have no illusions and keep both feet on the ground.
Thirdly, Roosevelt and Churchill had stressed the need to prevent a famine in Germany. The Soviet Government had no intention at all of stripping and starving Germany. On the contrary, in working out its reparations plan, the Soviet Government had always had in mind the creation of condi- tions in which the German people in the post-war years could exist on the basis of the average European living standard, and the Soviet reparations plan ensured such a possibility. Germany had every chance of building her post-
77
war economy on the basis of an expanding agriculture and light industries. There were all the conditions for it. The Soviet reparations plan provided no special restrictions in respect of the two branches of the German economy just named.
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that post-war Germany would be entirely free from arms expenditure, because she would be completely disarmed. This would yield a great saving: after all, pre-war Germany had spent, in various forms, up to $6,000 million a year on armaments. (Churchill exclaims: “Yes, that is a very important con- sideration!) That was why the Soviet Government was convinced that even if the Soviet reparations plan was implemented in full the German people would be ensured a decent life.
Both Churchill and Roosevelt could see from the above that the Soviet reparations plan was thoroughly conceived and based on quite sober and realistic calculations.
Churchill stated that in his opinion all these questions should be examined in commission.
Stalin asked where.
Churchill said a secret commission should be set up, and nothing of its deliberations should be made public.
Stalin replied that nothing would be published about the work of the commission. But the question was where Chur- chill wanted to set up such a commission. Was it at the Conference?
Churchill replied that there was no need for that at the time. The Conference should merely adopt a decision on the establishment of a Reparations Commission, which would subsequently examine the claims and the assets at Germany’s disposal, and also establish the priority in their allocation. It would be desirable to fix the priority with an eye not only to a nation’s contribution to the cause of victory, but also the suffering it had gone through. The U.S.S.R. headed the list, whatever the criterion. Any contradictions that might arise in the Commission should be settled by the Governments. As for the Russian reparations plan, it would take time to examine it. It could not be accepted at once.
Roosevelt said that the Reparations Commission should consist of representatives of the three Powers.
Churchill supported Roosevelt’s proposal.
78
Stalin stated that the setting up of a Reparations Commis- sion in Moscow, something all those present had accepted, was a very good thing. But that was not enough. Even the best of commissions could not do much unless it had the proper guide lines for its work. The guide lines should be laid down there, at the Conference.
He, Stalin, believed that the main principle underlying the allocation of reparations should be the following: the states which had borne the main burden of the war and organised the victory over the enemy should be the first to receive reparations. Those states were the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain. Compensation must be received not only by the Russians, but also by the Americans and the British, and to the greatest possible extent. If the United States, as Roosevelt said, was not interested in obtaining machinery or manpower from Germany, other more suitable forms of reparations could be found, for example, raw materials, etc. At any rate, it should be firmly established that those who had made the greatest contribu- tion to the enemy’s defeat had a prior right to reparations. Stalin asked whether Roosevelt and Churchill agreed with that.
Roosevelt declared that he agreed.
Churchill did not object either.
Stalin then said that in estimating the assets available in Germany for the payment of reparations, it was not the obtaining situation that should be taken as a starting point but the resources Germany would have after the end of the war, when all her population returned home, and the fac- tories started operating. Germany would then have more assets than she had at the time, and the states of which he had spoken could expect to have very considerable com- pensation for their damage. The three Ministers of Foreign Affairs would do well to discuss all that and then report to the Conference.
Churchill agreed that the Conference should indicate the main points of the directives for the Commission.
Stalin replied that he considered that to be correct.
Churchill said half in jest that if he seemed to be recal- citrant in discussing the question of reparations it was only because at home he had a Parliament and a Cabinet. If they refused to accept what Churchill had accepted at the Crimea Conference they might drive him out.
Stalin replied, in the same vein, that that was not so easy: victors were not driven out.
Churchill remarked that the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs could discuss the question of reparations the next day and later report to the Conference. He, Churchill, liked the principle: to each according to his needs, and from Ger- many according to her abilities. That principle should be made the basis of the reparations plan.
Stalin replied that he preferred another principle: to each according to his deserts.
Third Sitting at Livadia Palace February 6, 1945
[...) Roosevelt declared that a discussion of the question of an international security organisation could be started that day. Roosevelt believed it was their task to ensure peace for at least 50 years. In view of the fact that neither he, Roosevelt, nor Marshal Stalin, nor Churchill, had been present at Dumbarton Oaks, it would be a good idea for Stettinius to report on the question.
Stettinius said that an agreement had been reached at Dumbarton Oaks to leave certain questions for further examination and future solution. Of those questions the principal one was that of the voting procedure to be applied in the Security Council. At Dumbarton Oaks, the three delegations had had a thorough discussion of that question. Since then it had been subjected to continued and intensive study on the part of each of the three Governments.
On December 5, 1944, the President had sent Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill a proposal to have the question decided by setting forth Section C of Chapter VI of the proposals, adopted at Dumbarton Oaks, in the fol- lowing manner:
“C. Voting.
“1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
“9, Decisions of the Security Council on procedural mat- ters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
“3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members
80
including the concurring votes of the permanent members: provided that in decisions under Section A of Chapter VIII and under the second phrase of the first paragraph of Sec- tion C, Chapter VIII, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.”
The text which he, Stettinius, had just read out, contained minor drafting amendments made in accordance with the Soviet and British remarks on the initial text proposed by the President.
The American proposal was in complete accord with the special responsibility of the Great Powers for the mainten- ance of universal peace. In effect, the American proposal demanded unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all key issues relating to the maintenance of peace, including economic and military enforcement measures.
At the same time, the American proposal recognised the desirability of a direct declaration on the part of the per- manent members that the pacific settlement of any dispute that might arise was a matter of general concern, a matter on which the sovereign states which were not permanent members had the right to set forth their views without any limitations whatsoever. Unless such freedom of discussion was ensured in the Council, the establishment of a world organisation, which they all wanted, might be seriously hampered or even made altogether impossible. Without the right of free and full discussion of such matters in the Council, an international security organisation, even if established, would differ greatly from what had been origi- nally intended.
The document which the American delegation had _pre- sented to the two other delegations set forth the text of the provisions which he, Stettinius, had read out and a special list of decisions of the Council which, according to the American proposal, would demand unqualified unanimity, and a separate list of matters (in the sphere of disputes and their pacific settlement) on which a party to the dispute must abstain from voting.
From the standpoint of the Government of the United States, there were two important elements in the question of voting procedure.
The first was that for the maintenance of universal peace, which he, Stettinius, had mentioned, unanimity of the per- manent members was needed.
6-876 81
The second was that for the people of the United States it was of exceptional importance that fair treatment for all the members of the Organisation be provided for.
The task was to reconcile those two main elements. The proposals made by the President to Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill on December 5, 1944, provided a reasonable and just solution and combined the two elements satisfactorily.
Roosevelt declared that in his opinion it would be well to have Stettinius list the types of decisions which were to be adopted in the Security Council on the unanimity principle.
Stettinius said that, according to the formula proposed by the President, the following decisions would require an affirmative vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the votes of all the permanent members:
(I) Recommendations to the General Assembly on:
1. Admission of new members;
2. Suspension of a member;
3. Expulsion of a member;
4. Election of the Secretary-General.
(II) Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.
(III) Elimination of a threat to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace, including the following questions:
1. Is the peace endangered as a result of non-settlement of a dispute between the parties by means of their own choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council?
2. Is there a threat to the peace or breach of the peace from any other action on the part of one or another country?
3. What are the measures to be taken by the Council for the maintenance or restoration of the peace and how are these measures to be implemented?
4. Should not the implementation of enforcement measures be entrusted to a regional body?
(1V) Approval of special agreement or agreements on the provision of armed forces and facilities.
(V) Formulation of plans for a general system of arms regulation and presentation of such plans to the member states.
(VI) Decision on the question whether the nature and activity of a regional body or regional measures for the
82
as oe
maintenance of peace and security are compatible with the aims and purposes of the world organisation.
An affirmative vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the votes of all the permanent members, provided, however, that a member of the Council abstained from voting on any decision relating to a dispute to which he was a party, should be required for the following deci- sions relating to the pacific settlement of a dispute:
(1) Is the dispute or situation brought to the notice of the Council of such a nature that its continuance may endanger the peace?
(If) Should the Council call upon the sides to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice?
(III) Should the Council give recommendations to the sides in respect of the methods and procedures of settlement?
(IV) Should the legal aspects of the matter before the Council be referred to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion?
(V) In the event there is a regional body for the pacific settlement of local disputes, should the body be requested to deal with the disputes?
Roosevelt believed the question could be discussed and settled. Big and small nations had one and the same pur- pose, namely, the preservation of peace, and procedural issues should not hamper the attainment of that aim.
Stalin asked what was new in the proposals set forth by Stettinius as compared with what the President had com- municated in his message of December 5.
Roosevelt replied that those proposals were similar, with only minor drafting amendments.
Stalin asked what drafting amendments had been made.
Stettinius set forth these drafting amendments.
Molotov declared that the Soviet delegation also attached great importance to the questions raised and would like to study Stettinius’s proposal. That was why he proposed that the discussion of the question be postponed until the next day’s sitting.
Churchill remarked that he agreed with that. There should be no undue haste in the study of such an important inatter. Its discussion could be postponed until the next day. He had not been quite satisfied with the initial proposals worked out at Dumbarton Oaks, because he had not been quite sure that those proposals had taken full account of
6*
83
the real position of the three Great Powers. After studying the President’s new proposals, Churchill’s doubts had disap- peared, at any rate, as far as the British Commonwealth of Nations and the British Empire were concerned. That also applied to the independent dominions of the British Crown.
Churchill recognised that the question of whether the peace would be built on sound foundations depended on the friendship and co-operation of the three Great Powers; however, the Allies would be putting themselves in a false position and would be unfair to their intentions, if they did not provide for the possibility of the small states freely ex- pressing their claims. Otherwise it would appear that the three chief Powers claimed to rule the world. As it was what they actually wanted was to serve the world and safeguard it from the horrors that had hit most of the na- tions in the current war. That was why the three Great Powers should show a readiness to submit to the interest of the common cause.
He, Churchill, was naturally thinking primarily of the effect the new situation would have on the future of the British Commonwealth of Nations. He would like to give a concrete example, an example which was a difficult one for Britain—Hong Kong. If the President’s proposal was adopted, and China requested the return of Hong Kong, Great Britain would have the right to express her point of view and defend it; however, Great Britain would not be able to take part in voting on the five questions set out at the end of the American document. For her part, China would have the right fully to express her view on the ques- tion of Hong Kong, and the Security Council would have to decide on the issue, without the British Government taking part in the voting.
Stalin asked whether Egypt was to be a member of the Assembly.
Churchill replied that Egypt would be a member of the Assembly but not of the Council.
Stalin declared that he would like to take another example, that of the Suez Canal, which was situated on the territory of Egypt.
Churchill asked that his example be examined first. As- suming that the British Government could not agree to the examination of one of the questions dealt with in Para- graph 3, because it considered .that the question infringed
84
the sovereignty of the British Empire. In that case, the British Government would be assured of success, because, in accordance with Paragraph 3, every permanent member would have the right to veto the actions of the Security Council. On the other hand, it would be unfair for China not to have the possibility of expressing her view on the substance of the case.
The same applied to Egypt. In the event Egypt raised a question against the British pertaining to the Suez Canal, he, Churchill, would allow the discussion of the question without any apprehension, because British interests were ensured by Paragraph 3, which provided for the right of veto. He also believed that if Argentina made a claim against the United States, the United States would submit to the established procedure of examination, but the United States would have the right to object and veto any decision by the Security Council. It could apply the Monroe Doctrine.
Roosevelt said that in the Tehran Declaration the three Powers had announced their readiness to accept responsibil- ity for the establishment of a peace that would receive the approval of the peoples of the world.
Churchill stated that for the reasons which he had set forth the British Government did not object to the adoption of the U.S. proposals. Churchill believed it would be un- desirable to create the impression that the three Powers wanted to dominate the world, without letting the other countries express their opinion.
Stalin declared that he would first of all ask that the Soviet delegation be handed the document which Stettinius had read out, because it was hard to study the proposals it contained by ear. To him, Stalin, it seemed that the said document was a commentary on the President’s proposals.
Referring to the interpretation of the American proposals made at the sitting, Stalin said it seemed to him the Dum- barton Oaks decisions had aimed to ensure various coun- tries not only the right to voice their opinion. That right was not worth much. No one denied it. The matter was much more serious. If any nation raised a question of great importance to it, it would do so not only to have the op- portunity to set out its view, but to obtain a decision on it. None of those present would dispute the right of nations to speak in the Assembly. But that was not the heart of the matter. Churchill apparently believed that if China raised
85
the question of Hong Kong, her only desire would be to speak out. That was not so. China would demand a decision. In much the same way, if Egypt raised the question of a return of the Suez Canal she would not be content with voicing her opinion on the matter. Egypt would demand a solution of the question. That was why the question was not just of ensuring the possibility of voicing one’s opinions, but of much more important things.
Churchill expressed the apprehension that there might be an impression that the three Great Powers wanted to domi- nate the world. But who was contemplating such domina- tion? Was it the United States? No, it was not thinking of that. (The President laughed and made an eloquent gesture.) Was it Britain? No, once again. (Churchill laughed and made an eloquent gesture.) Thus, two Great Powers were beyond suspicion. That left the third—the U.S.S.R. So it was the U.S.S.R. that was striving for world domination? (General laughter.) Or could it be China that was striving for world domination? (General laughter.) It was clear that the talk of striving for world domination was pointless. His friend Churchill could not name a single Power that wanted to dominate the world.
Churchill interposed that he himself did not, of course, believe in the striving for world domination on the part of any of the three Allies. But the position of those Allies was so powerful that others might think so, unless the appro- priate preventive measures were taken.
Stalin, continuing his speech, declared that so far two Great Powers had adopted the charter of an international security organisation, which, in the opinion of Churchill, would protect them from being charged with a desire to rule the world. The third Power had not yet given its con- sent to the charter. However, he would study the proposals formulated by Stettinius, and would possibly see the point more clearly. He believed, however, that the Allies were faced with much more serious problems than the right of nations to express their opinion or the question of the three chief Powers striving for world domination.
Churchill said there was no reason to fear anything undesirable even in the event of the American proposals being adopted. Indeed, so long as they were all alive, there was nothing to fear. They would not allow any dangerous divergences between them. They would not permit another
86
aggression against anyone of their countries. But 10 years or possibly less might pass, and they would be gone. There would be a new generation which had not gone through what they had, and which would possibly view many ques- tions in a different light. What would happen then? They seemed to be setting themselves the task of ensuring peace for at least another 50 years. Or was that the impression he, Stalin, had got because of his naivete?
The unity of the three Powers was the most important requisite for the preservation of a lasting peace. If such unity was preserved, there was no need to fear the German danger. Thought should, therefore, be given to how best to ensure a united front between the three Powers, to which France and China should be added. That was why the ques- tion of the future charter of an international security organ- isation acquired such importance. It was necessary to create as many obstacles as possible to any divergence between the three chief Powers in future. A charter should be framed that would make it as difficult as possible for conflicts to arise between them. That was the main task.
On the more concrete question of the voting in the Security Council, Stalin asked the conference to excuse him for not having had the time to study the Dumbarton Oaks documents in every detail. He had been very busy with some other matters and hoped to have the indulgence of the British and American delegations.
Roosevelt and Churchill indicated by gestures and excla- mations that they were well aware of what Stalin had been doing.
Stalin, continuing, said that, as far as he understood, all conflicts which might be brought up for examination by the Security Council fell into two categories. The first included disputes whose settlement demanded the application of economic, political, military or other kinds of sanctions. ‘The second category included disputes which might be settled by peaceful means, without the application of sanctions. Stalin asked whether his understanding was correct.
Roosevelt and Churchill replied that it was correct.
Stalin then declared that, as far as he had understood it, there was to be freedom of discussion in the examination of conflicts of the first category, but the unanimity of the permanent members of the Council was required in the adop- tion of a decision. In that case, all the permanent members
87
of the Council should take part in the voting, i.e., the Power which was a party to a dispute would not be asked to leave. As for conflicts of the second category which were to be settled by peaceful means, another procedure was proposed in that case: the Power which was a party to a dispute (including permanent members of the Council) should not take part in the voting. Stalin asked whether his understand- ing of the provision was correct.
Roosevelt and Churchill again confirmed that Stalin had a fully correct understanding of the provision.
Stalin, concluding, said the Soviet Union was being ac- cused of putting too much emphasis on the question of the voting in the Security Council. The Soviet Union was being reproached for making too much ado on the point. Indeed, the Soviet Union did pay great attention to the voting procedure, because the Soviet Union was most of all interest- ed in the decisions to be adopted by the Security Council. After all, the decisions would be adopted by a vote. Dis- cussions could go on for a hundred years, without deciding anything. But it was the decisions that mattered for the Soviet Union. And not only for it.
He, Stalin, asked those present to return for a moment to the examples given at the sitting. If China demanded the return of Hong Kong or Egypt the return of the Suez Canal, the question would be up for a vote in the Assembly and in the Security Council. Stalin could assure his friend Churchill that China and Egypt would not be alone in that. They would have their friends in an international organi- sation. That had a direct bearing on the question of voting.
Churchill stated that if the said countries demanded the satisfaction of their claims, Great Britain would say “no”. The authority of an international organisation could not be used against the three great Powers.
Stalin asked whether that was in fact the case.
Eden replied that countries might talk and argue but no decision could be adopted without the consent of the three chief Powers.
Stalin asked once again whether that was actually the
case. Churchill and Roosevelt replied in the affirmative. Stettinius declared that no economic sanctions could be applied by the Security Council without the unanimity of the permanent members.
88
Molotov asked whether the same applied to recommen- dations.
Churchill replied that that applied only to those recom- mendations which were mentioned in the five points formu- lated at the end of the American document. The interna- tional security organisation did not exclude diplomatic rela- tions between the great and the small countries. Diplomatic procedures would continue to exist. It would be wrong to exaggerate the power or to abuse it or to raise questions that could divide the three chief Powers.
Stalin said there was another danger. His colleagues surely remembered that during the Russo-Finnish war the British and the French had roused the League of Nations against the Russians, isolated the Soviet Union and expelled it from the League of Nations, by mobilising everyone against the U.S.S.R. A repetition of such things in future must be precluded.
Eden declared that that could not happen if the American proposals were adopted.
Churchill confirmed that in the said case that kind of danger would be ruled out.
Molotov said that was the first time the Soviet side heard of that.
Roosevelt declared that there could be no recurrence of a case similar to the one mentioned by Marshal Stalin, because the expulsion of a member required the consent of all the permanent members.
Stalin pointed out that even if the adoption of the Ameri- can proposals made it impossible to expel a member, there still remained the possibility of mobilising public opinion against any one member.
Churchill said he could allow a case when a broad cam- paign was started against a member, but then diplomacy would be operating at the same time. Churchill did not think that the President would want to come out against Britain or support any action against her. He was confident that Roosevelt would want to stop such attacks. Churchill was also confident that Marshal Stalin would not want to come out against Britain, without having a talk with Britain beforehand. He, Churchill, was confident that a way to settle disputes could always be found. At any rate, he could vouch for himself.
89
Stalin declared that he, too, could vouch for himself; (half in jest) perhaps Maisky over there would start attacking Britain?
Roosevelt noted that the unity of the Great Powers was one of their aims. He, Roosevelt, believed that the American proposals promoted the attainment of that aim. If any contradictions should unfortunately arise between the Great Powers, they would be known to all the world, despite any voting procedure. At any rate, it was impossible to elimi- nate the discussion of contradictions in the Assembly. The American Government believed that by allowing freedom of discussion in the Council, the Great Powers would dem- onstrate to the world the confidence they had in each other.
Stalin replied that that was correct and proposed that the discussion of the question be continued the next day.
Churchill asked whether they could pass on to the Polish question.
Stalin and Roosevelt agreed with Churchill’s proposal.
Roosevelt stated that the United States was far away from Poland, and he, Roosevelt, would ask the other two partic- ipants in the Conference to set forth their considerations. There were five or six million persons of Polish origin in the United States. His, Roosevelt's, position, like that of the majority of the Poles resident in the United States, coincid- ed with the position he had set forth in Tehran. He, Roose- velt, stood for the Curzon line. That, in essence, was accepted by most Poles, but the Poles, like the Chinese, were always worried about “losing face”.
Stalin asked which Poles were meant, the real ones or the émigrés? The real Poles lived in Poland.
Roosevelt replied that all Poles wanted to get something to “save face”. His position as President would be eased if the Soviet Government allowed the Poles the possibility of “saving face”. It would be well to examine the question of concessions to the Poles on the southern sector of the Curzon line. He, Roosevelt, did not insist on his proposal, but wanted the Soviet Government to take it into consid- eration.
The establishment of a permanent government in Poland was the most essential part of the Polish question. Roosevelt believed that public opinion in the United States was op- posed to America’s recognition of the Lublin Government,
90
because the people of the United States had the impression that the Lublin Government represented only a small part of the Polish people. As far as he was aware, the American people would like to see in Poland a government of national unity, including representatives of all Polish parties: the Workers’ or Communist Party, the Peasant Party, the Socialist Party, the National Democratic Party and the others. He, Roosevelt, was not personally acquainted with any member of the Lublin Government or any member of the Polish Government in London. He personally knew only Mikolajcezyk. During his visit to Washington, Mikolajczyk gave Roosevelt the impression of being a decent man.
He, Roosevelt, believed it was important to set up a government in Poland that would represent the mass of the people in the country and enjoy their support. It might be only a provisional government. There were many methods of forming such a government and it did not matter which one was chosen. He, Roosevelt, had a proposal to establish a Presidential Council, consisting of a small number of outstanding Poles. That Presidential Council would be entrusted with the task of forming a provisional govern- ment of Poland. That was the only proposal he had brought with him from the United States three thousand miles away. Roosevelt added, he hoped, of course, that Poland would have the most friendly relations with the Soviet Union.
Stalin said Poland would have friendly relations not only with the Soviet Union but with all the Allies.
Roosevelt said he would like to hear the opinion of Mar- shal Stalin and Churchill concerning his proposal. Solution of the Polish question would be of great help to the Allied cause.
Churchill said he was authorised to express the British Government’s positive attitude to the President’s proposal. He had always spoken publicly in Parliament and _ else- where about the British Government’s intention to recog- nise the Curzon line as it was interpreted by the Soviet Government, i.e., with Lvov remaining in the Soviet Union. He, Churchill, and Eden had been much criticised for that, both in Parliament and in the Conservative Party, but he had always believed that after the tragedy Russia had gone through in defending herself against the German aggression, and after the efforts Russia had exerted in the liberation of Poland, the Russian claims to Lvov and the Curzon line
91
were not based on might but on right. Churchill still con- tinued to hold that view.
But Churchill was much more interested in the question of Polish sovereignty and the freedom and independence of Poland than the specification of her frontiers. He wanted the Poles to have a homeland, where they could live as they thought best. He had heard Marshal Stalin announce the same aim several times with the greatest firmness. Since he, Churchill, had always had trust in Marshal Stalin’s statements on the sovereignty and independence of Poland, he did not think the question of frontiers was very impor- tant.
Great Britain had no material interest in Poland. She had entered the war to defend Poland from the German aggres- sion.! Great Britain was concerned with Poland because it was a matter of honour for her. Great Britain could never be satisfied with a solution which did not ensure Poland a position in which she could be master of her own house. But he, Churchill, made one reservation: the freedom of Poland should not mean allowing any hostile intentions or intrigues against the Soviet Union on her part. Churchill said Great Britain would not ask to have Poland free if she had any hostile intentions in respect of the Soviet Union.
Churchill hoped that the participants in the Conference would not leave without taking practical measures on the Polish question. There were now two Polish Governments in respect of which the Allies had differing opinions. He, Churchill, had not had any direct contact with the members of the Polish Government in London. Despite the fact that
1 Here Churchill obviously erred against the truth. When Hitler Germany attacked Poland on September 1, 1939, Britain, formally declaring war on Germany, did nothing to implement her guarantees given Poland earlier. Churchill himself wrote in his memoirs:
“Astonishment was world-wide when Hitler’s crashing onslaught upon Poland and the declarations of war upon Germany by Britain and France were followed only by a _ prolonged and _ oppressive pause.... We contented ourselves with dropping pamphlets to rouse the Germans to a higher morality. This strange phase of the war on land and in the air astounded everyone. France and Britain remained impassive while Poland was in a few weeks destroyed or subjugated by the whole might of the German war machine. Hitler had no reason to complain of this.” (W. Churchill, The Second World War. The Gathering Storm, Boston, 1948, pp. 422-423.)—Ed.
92
ea
—
the British Government recognised the Polish Government in London, it did not deem it necessary to meet with mem- bers of that Government. But Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski were intelligent and honest men, and the British Government had friendly relations with them.
He, Churchill, asked whether it was possible there to set up a Polish Government like that the President had spoken about, until the time the Polish people could freely elect a government which would be recognised by the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States and the other United Nations recognising the Polish Government in London. Churchill believed the establishment of the body of which the President had spoken would pave the way for the elabo- ration by the Polish people of their constitution and the election of their administration. If that could be done, a great step would be made towards peace and welfare in Central Europe. Churchill supported the President’s propos- al. But, of course, Churchill added, the Red Army’s communication lines had to be ensured in all circum- stances.
Stalin said that as Churchill had just stated, for the British Government the question of Poland was one of honour. Stalin understood that. For his part, however, he had to say that for the Russians the question of Poland was not only one of honour but of security as well. It was a question of honour because in the past the Russians had greatly sinned against Poland. The Soviet Government was trying to atone for those sins. It was a question of security because the most important strategic problems of the Soviet state were con- nected with Poland.
The point was not only that Poland was a neighbouring country. That, of course, was important, but the essence of the problem lay much deeper. Throughout history, Poland had always been a corridor for an enemy attacking Russia. Suffice it to recall only the previous 30 years: in that period, the Germans twice went across Poland to attack Russia. Why had the enemies crossed Poland so easily until then? Chiefly because Poland has been weak. The Polish corri- dor could not be closed mechanically only by Russian forces on the outside. It could be reliably locked only from the inside, by Poland’s own forces. For that Poland must be strong. That was why the Soviet Union had a stake in creating a powerful, free and independent Poland. The
93
question of Poland was a question of life and death for the Soviet state.
Hence the sharp turn from the policy of tsarism the Soviet Union had made in respect of Poland. The tsarist Govern- ment was known to have tried to assimilate Poland. The Soviet Government had absolutely changed that inhuman policy and had taken the road of friendship with Poland and of safeguarding her independence. That was where the reasons lay for the Russian desire to have a strong, independ- ent and free Poland.
Then about some of the specific questions which had been dealt with during the discussion and on which there were differences.
First of all, about the Curzon Line. He, Stalin, felt bound to remark that the Curzon Line had not been invented by the Russians. It had been produced by Curzon, Clemen- ceau, and the Americans who had taken part in the Paris Conference of 1919. The Russians had not been present at that conference. The Curzon Line had been adopted on the basis of ethnic data, contrary to the will of the Russians. Lenin had not accepted that Line. He had not wanted to give Poland Belostok and Belostok Region, which in accord- ance with the Curzon Line had had to be handed over to Poland.
The Soviet Government had already deviated from Lenin’s position. Stalin asked whether the Allies wanted the Soviet leaders to be less Russian than Curzon and Clemen- ceau. In that case they would disgrace them. What would the Ukrainians say if they accepted the Allies’ proposals? They might say that Stalin and Molotov had turned out to be less reliable defenders of the Russians and the Ukrainians than Curzon and Clemenceau. In what light would Stalin appear then on his return to Moscow? No, it was better to let the war against the Germans go on a little longer, but the Soviet Union had to be in a position to compensate Poland in the west at Germany’s expense.
During Mikolajczyk’s visit to Moscow he had asked Stalin which frontier for Poland in the west the Soviet Government would recognise. Mikolajczyk had been very pleased to hear that the Soviet Union recognised the line along the Neisse River as Poland’s western frontier. By way of explanation it should be said that there were two Neisse rivers: one of them ran nearer east, by Breslau, and the
94
other farther west. Stalin believed that Poland’s western frontier should run along the Western Neisse, and he asked Roosevelt and Churchill to support him in that.
Another question on which Stalin would like to say a few words was that of the establishment of a Polish Govern- ment. Churchill proposed the establishment of a Polish Government there, at the Conference. Stalin hoped that was a slip of the tongue on Churchill’s part: how could a Polish Government be set up without the participation of the Poles? Many people called him, Stalin, a dictator, and did not believe he was a democrat, but he had enough demo- cratic feeling to refrain from setting up a Polish Govern- ment without the Poles. A Polish Government could be set up only with the participation and consent of the Poles.
A suitable moment for that had been Churchill’s visit to Moscow the previous autumn, when he had brought Miko- lajczyk, Grabski and Romer along with him. At that time representatives of the Lublin Government had also been invited to Moscow. A meeting had been arranged between the London and the Lublin Poles. There had even been in- dications of some points of agreement. Churchill should recall that. Afterwards Mikolajczyk had gone to London with the aim of returning to Moscow soon to take the last steps in organising a Polish Government. Instead, however, Mikolajczyk had been dropped from the Polish Govern- ment in London for insisting on an agreement with the Lublin Government. The Polish Government in London, headed by Arcyszewski and led by Razkewicz, was opposed to any agreement with the Lublin Government. What was more, it took a hostile attitude to such an agreement. The London Poles called the Lublin Government an assem- blage of criminals and bandits. Naturally, the former Lublin Government and later the Warsaw Government paid them in kind, and called the London Poles traitors and turncoats. How were they to be united in the circumstances? He, Sta- lin, did not know.
The leading members of the Warsaw Government—Bie- rut, Osobka-Morawski and Rola-Zymierski—did not even want to hear of any unity with the Polish Government in London. Stalin had asked the Warsaw Poles what conces- sions they could make. He had got the following answer: the Warsaw Poles could stand in their midst such persons from among the London Poles as Grabski and Zeligowski,
95
but they would not hear of Mikolajczyk being Prime Min- ister. Stalin was prepared to make every effort to unite the Poles, but only if it had any chance of success. What was to be done? Perhaps the Warsaw Poles should be invited to the Conference? Or perhaps they should be invited to Moscow to talk things over?
In conclusion, Stalin would like to deal with yet another question—a very important one—on which he would be speaking as a military man. What would he, as a military man, want of the Government of a country liberated by the Red Army? He wanted only one thing: that the Government ensured law and order in the Red Army’s rear, and that it prevented civil war breaking out behind its front lines. After all, the military did not care much about the kind of government; what was important was that they should not be shot at from behind. There was the Warsaw Government in Poland. In Poland, there were also agents of the London Government who were connected with underground circles styling themselves ‘forces of internal resistance”. As a mili- tary man, Stalin compared the activity of the two groups and inevitably arrived at the following conclusion: the Warsaw Government was doing a fair job of ensuring law and order in the Red Army’s rear, whereas there was nothing but harm from the “forces of internal resistance’’. Those “forces” had already managed to kill 212 Red Army men. They were attacking Red Army depots to seize arms. They violated orders on the registration of radio transmit- ters on the territory liberated by the Red Army. The “forces of internal resistance” were violating all the laws of war. They complained that the Red Army was arresting them. Stalin stated flatly that if those “forces” continued their attacks on Soviet soldiers, they would be shot.
In the final analysis, from the purely military stand- point, the Warsaw Government turned out to be useful, and the London Government and its agents in Poland—harm- ful. Of course, military men would always support a govern- ment which ensured law and order in their rear, without which the Red Army could not continue its successes. Law and order in the rear was one of the conditions of Soviet successes. That was understood not only by the military, but by the non-military as well. That was how matters stood.
Roosevelt proposed that the discussion of the Polish ques- tion be postponed until the next day.
96
Churchill said that the Soviet Government and the British Government had different sources of information. The British Government did not believe that the Lublin Govern- ment represented even a third of the Polish people. That was the opinion of the British Government. Of course, there might be a mistake in that. Clearly, one could not believe every story told by people returning from Poland. The British Government wanted an agreement because it was